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THE INTEGRATION INDUSTRIES SCHEME OP THE 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade the concept of economic inte­
gration has found an important place in economic theory.
The first significant attempt to put this theory into prac­
tice was the development of the European Economic Community. 
This outstanding movement put into play a genuine concern on 
the part of all countries for the nature and the significance 
of this new economic phenomenon.
Significant theoretical models have been constructed 
which demonstrate the possible benefits and defects of inte­
gration. Although most analyses have been static in nature, 
the long-run dynamic effects have also been given considera­
tion. It is evident, however, that almost all contributions 
have been made against the background of the European move­
ment, Economic integration theory has been approached 
generally from the point of view of a developed society.
The European movement was looked upon by under­
developed countries only in terms of the effect which it 
had upon their own economies. The most unappealing aspect
— 1 —
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of the EEC was the common external tariff barrier to outside 
countries. Given the importance of the European market, it 
was believed that this could cause exports from Latin America 
to Europe to decrease considerably.
Consequently, some developing countries responded 
quickly to the possibility of economic integration among 
their own economies. The groundwork had been laid for them 
by economic theoreticians, and a sample of the practical 
application of the theory was provided by the European move­
ment, However, the potential effects of integration among 
underdeveloped countries were unclear. There is still a 
considerable vacuum in economic theory concerning the rele­
vance of economic integration to the developing areas.
Little is known about the impact of integration on improv­
ing the agricultural output or expanding the industrial 
base of underdeveloped countries.
In spite of this situation, many of the developing 
areas have proceeded to experiment with economic integration 
under the assumption that there are benefits to be gained.
One of these movements is taking place in Central America 
and is called the Central American Common Market (CACM). 
Consisting of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
and Costa Rica, this movement is in many respects the most 
dynamic integration program in today’s world. It officially 
went into operation in 1958 and is currently approaching the 
fulfillment of all the requirements of a customs union.
c a  ^  tsm
This integration program is, in reality, a mechanism 
to help bring about the development of the Central American 
region. As one might expect, there is considerable emphasis 
upon the role that the Common Market can play in building 
the industrial base. This interest is exemplified by the 
fact that an industrial agreement was developed simultane­
ously with the first treaty of economic integration. It is 
referred to as the Agreement on the Regime of Integration 
Industries,
Central America maintains a small or practically 
nonexistent industrial complex. One of the reasons for a 
lack of growth in this sector is the limited market which 
any one couptry possesses. Each of the countries of Central 
America has a per capita income of less than $400 and a GNP 
of less than 800 million dollars. Individually, they cannot 
support an industrial base of any significance.
It is the purpose of the Integration Industries 
Program to take advantage of the enlarged market resulting 
from integration. It is believed that new industries will 
evolve if they can solicit thé demand of the entire regional 
market. This scheme is particularly aimed at developing 
industries which can incur decreases in per unit costs as 
output increases. The chances of a large output for 
individual firms are limited when sales possibilities are 
dictated by the level of income in each of the respective 
national territories. Although still small relative to 
the developed areas, the regional market can magnify
- 4 -
demand considerably. The probability of developing an 
Industrial base Is therefore enhanced.
The Integration Industries Scheme Is an example of 
Industrial development through the use of economic planning. 
This development scheme uses regional comparative advantage 
to determine which countries can most efficiently produce 
commodities dependent upon a large market. The firms are 
allocated to different countries on the basis of local 
resource availability and overall area demand. The number 
of Integration firms existing at any given time Is deter­
mined by the condition of demand. Because of demand limi­
tations, this number will typically be small.
A firm desiring to become an Integration industry 
must follow specific procedures established by the treaty. 
Integration firms are accorded special benefits and pro­
tections not given to other producers. Also, each firm Is 
subjected to various regulations.
Purpose and Scope 
The Integration Industries Program Is a unique 
experiment In Industrial development. It has been staunchly 
supported by the Economic Commission for Latin America In 
spite of the fact that the United States government has 
taken a dim view of this particular system (See Chapter V). 
The Common Market has generally progressed well; yet. Inte­
gration Industries have been slow In coming. In terms of 
being a stimulus to industrial development, this program 
has thus far been of negligible Importance,
This topic is approached from the point of view of 
regional integration and its subsequent effect upon economic 
development. The Integration Industries Scheme provides an 
opportunity to study a unique experiment in industrial 
development. Moreover, it constitutes a valid case study 
of the problems which characterize the use of integration 
as a tool for industrial development, A coordinated system 
of economic Integration is not easily conceived, especially 
when development considerations are of extreme importance. 
Even though a process of regional integration seems to be 
a reasonable approach to improve development possibilities, 
it is marked with uncertainty and proves to be an arduous 
and painful transition. The Integration Industries Scheme 
reveals the nature and the significance of the problems of 
regional industrial growth.
A detailed analysis of the Integration Industries 
Scheme is the major task of this project. Basic to the 
analysis is the determination of the objectives of the pro­
gram, including the theoretical considerations which under- 
lie these objectives. One of the important defects of the 
scheme is its monopolistic character. In this connection, 
information on the regulatory aspects, as well as the 
incentive measures, of the program are presented. This is 
followed by a description of the designation procedures 
involved in allocating integration industries and a brief 
history of the scheme during its first years of operation.
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Also of particular importance is an analysis of the 
reasons for the lack of success which has characterized the 
early years of the program. Through an evaluation of its 
major problems and a comparison of the Integration Indus­
tries Scheme with other regional mechanisms now in use, an 
attempt is made to ascertain the value of this program in 
the regional development framework of Central America, 
Lastly, suggestions are made to improve the implementation 
and operation of integration industries.
The theory upon which the Integration Industries 
Scheme is based has not been challenged within"an empirical 
framework. The assumption is made that economic integra­
tion increases sales opportunities and that this allows the 
occurrence of economies of large-scale production. Although 
this project does not propose to empirically verify this 
basic theory of integration, some limited information con­
cerning the effect of the Central American Common Market 
upon the sales and costs of production of one of the inte­
gration firms now in operation is presented in Appendix A,
The theme which permeates this paper is necessarily 
one of industrialization. An assumption is Implicitly made 
that this sector is an important variable in the develop­
ment process of Central America. Arguments are available 
which deny that Central America or any other developing 
area needs to follow policies promoting industrialization. 
Even though these are of some importance, they are not
- 7 -
considered as relevant to this endeavor» It is assumed, 
therefore, that Central America needs to expand its indus­
trial base» The Integration Industries Scheme is examined 
within the context of its importance in fulfilling this 
goal.
It is further assumed that the most logical approach 
for a developing country to use in building an industrial 
complex is that of import substitution. Since the very 
essence of a common market is dependent upon a common 
external tariff, it seems reasonable that this policy should 
be carried over into the industrial sector. Moreover, meas­
urement of the volume of imports is typically the best method 
available to developing countries for determining the amount 
of consumer demand for a given product. There are various 
authors who explain by logical and persuasive reasoning that 
this approach is not sound development policy. These argu­
ments are not considered in this paper. The only theoreti­
cal and practical considerations concerning import substitu­
tion which are incorporated within this project are those 
which deal with the magnitude of the external tariff barrier» 
That is, a policy of tariff protection in support of infant 
industries is looked upon as being desirable as long as it 
is not abused. This abuse begins when the prices of external 




The data and Information relevant to this project 
were collected during a recent field trip to Central America. 
Numerous interviews were conducted with various officials 
associated with the Common Market. Also, research was con­
ducted at SIECA, the legal organism of the Common Marketj 
ICAITI, the Institute for Industrial Research and Technol­
ogy of the Common Market; and ROCAP, the U.S. AID Mission 
to Central America and Panama,
This project is divided into seven chapters. Like 
Chapter I, Chapters II and III are introductory in nature. 
Chapter II consists of a general summary of the theory of 
economic integration. Important contributions are summa­
rized, and special consideration is given to the determina­
tion of the relevance of integration to the developing 
areas. Chapter III presents an introductory survey of the 
Central American Common Market, Emphasis is placed on the 
increase in regional trade, economic growth, and the insti­
tutions which have been developed to implement the idea of 
regionalism,
A history and analysis of the Agreement cn the 
Regime of Integration Industries is the subject of Chap­
ter IV. This includes an examination of the treaty and the 
subsequent protocols. Information is presented on the goals 
of the program, the tools of implementation, as well as a 
brief history of the Integration Industries Program,
a* ^  «E*
Chapter V outlines the major problems which char­
acterize the Integration Industries Program» The particular 
weaknesses of the schema are presented with emphasis on the 
legal bottlenecks and the aspects of control. Other mecha­
nisms to promote industrialization are compared and con­
trasted with integration industries in Chapter VI. An 
attempt is made to determine the value of the Integration 
Industries Scheme as a mechanism to promote industrial 
growth. Suggestions are made to improve the methods of 
designating integration industries and the system of regu­
lation. A summary of the study and its major findings are 
reserved for Chapter VII.
CHAPTER II
THE THEORY OP ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; 
THE DEVELOPING AREAS
Introduction
Pew economists would disagree that free trade would 
contribute to efficiency in the utilization of resources.
It is recognized, however, that maximum efficiency can 
become a reality only under conditions of pure competition. 
Market imperfections exist in world markets and within 
national territories. On a national level, attempts are 
made to correct imperfections in economic systems through 
varying degrees of sts,te intervention. Such intervention 
on a world-wide basis is not likely.
The case for multilateral free trade rests upon 
the efficiency of the price system, and this mecha,nism is 
not perfect. Por example, the quantities of a commodity 
demanded and supplied may not respond to price changes 
because of rigidities. Also, where competition is imper­
fect, restrictions in production and distorted prices may 
result.
Contrariwise, nationalistic policies of protec­
tionism lead to a misallocation of resources. Tariffs
—  10 —
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tend to cause higher internaX prices than wouXd exist under 
free trade» These high prices may attract entrepreneurs 
and bring about a distortion in resource aXXocation» 
^though protection is acceptabXe to most governments, 
this method of promoting economic growth typicaXXy does not 
Xead to efficient production or consumption»
As an alternative to free trade and national pro­
tectionism, recent years have witnessed a new deveXopment 
in international trade calXed economic integration» This 
is the removal of tariff barriers among countries partici­
pating in a regionaX trading group»
Economic integration is sometimes referred to in 
the GeneraX Theory of the Second Best» "The GeneraX Theory 
of the Second Best states that if one of the Paretian opti­
mum conditions cannot be fuXfiXXed a second best optimum
situation is achieved onXy by departing from aXX other opti-
1mum conditions»" That is, if there is introduced into a 
general equilibrium system a specific constraint which pre­
vents the attainment of the Paretian optimum, the other 
Paretian conditions are not desirable»
In the case of one form of economic integration 
called a customs union, tariffs among member countries are 
removed, but there remains an outside tariff against
R̂, G. Lipsey and Calvin Lancaster, "The GeneraX 
Theory of the Second Best." The Review of Economic Studies, 
XXIV, No. 63 (X956-X957), P. 12.
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nonmember countries. Although this does not satisfy all of 
the Paretian optimum conditions-^that is, making all rela= 
tive prices equal to all rates of transformation in produc= 
tion— it brings about the satisfaction of some of the 
optimum conditions— that is, making some relative prices 
equal to some rates of transformation in production. This 
may have the effect of either increasing or decreasing 
world trade.^ A customs union is an application of the 
negative corollary of the General Theory of the Second Best, 
which states that nothing can be said a priori about the 
welfare and efficiency aspects of a change which permits 
the satisfaction of some, but not all, of the Paretian 
conditions.2
The first goal of this chapter is to summarize some 
of the important theoretical aspects of economic integra­
tion. Both the benefits and the drawbacks of the system 
are considered briefly. In spite of the fact that the 
applicability of integration to the developing areas is 
largely unknown, an effort is made to establish the role 
of integration among such economies. This is accomplished 
in the background of the most important theoretical con­
tributions in the field Of economic integration.
^See Pages 14 and 18.
^Lipsey and Lancaster, op. cit., p. l4.
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Basle Theory of Economie Integration —
Stages of Integration
Countries desiring economic Integration actually 
have several choices open to them» Professor Balassa, one 
of the leading authorities In this field, has broken Inte­
gration Into five general classifications,^ The first 
stage Is called the free trade area. This connotates the 
removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions between 
participating countries. Each member maintains Its own 
tariff policy against nonmembers. The second stage Is the 
customs union. In this case, the tariffs against nonmembers 
are equalized. I.e., a common external tariff wall Is 
established.
The third stage, called a common market, Implies 
that Impediments to factor movements, as well as trade 
restrictions, are removed; that Is, labor and capital are 
allowed to move freely throughout an Integration area. The 
fourth stage of Integration, the economic union. Includes 
all of the before-mentioned steps plus a harmonization of 
national economic policies. The area should. In this case, 
begin to operate largely as If It were merged Into one. 
Economic policies are not antithetical but, rather, are
^Bela Balassa, The Theory of the Economic Integra­
tion (Homewood, Illinois: HIchard D, Irwin, Inc,, 1961), 
p, 2,
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complementary to the common effort of regional growth. The 
last and most ideal phase is total economic integration. 
This not only implies unification of monetary, fiscal, 
social, and countercyclical policies, but also connotates 
a supranational authority whose decisions are binding upon 
member states.
The process of integration is a cumulative one. As 
countries proceed and are successful at making economic, 
social, and political harmony between nations more of a 
reality, the closer do these same nations approach full 
economic integration. If they are successful at bringing 
about the elimination of tariffs, they are participating in 
the most moderate type of integration called a free trade 
area.
The Benefits of Integration
The impact of economic integration is primarily 
measured on the basis of production and consumption and must 
be considered on both static and dynamic levels. Static 
analysis is concerned with the short-run impact resulting 
because of the removal of tariffs. The removal of these 
duties could result in a saving in cost due to a shift in 
purchases from a higher cost to a lower cost source of 
supply. For this to occur, the purchase of products must 
be shifted from national sources to other countries within 
the integration area.
- 15 -
This effect is best explained through the use of an 
example. Assume the money costs of producing a particular 
commodity are 25 dollars for country A, 20 dollars for coun= 
try B, and 15 dollars for country C, If country A maintains 
a tariff of 15 dollars per unit, its domestic product will 
be cheaper than the products of country B or C. However, 
if countries A and B form a customs union with a common 
eternal tariff of 15 dollars per unit, country A should 
now buy the product from country B for 20 dollars. This 
price is lower than either A’s internal price of 25 dollars 
or C»s price of 30 dollars, (Country C»s price is now the 
sum of the 15-dollar domestic cost and the 15-dollar tariff.) 
Thus, country A imports from country B a product which was 
formerly produced domestically. Costs are, therefore, 
reduced because of purchases from a lower cost source of 
supply.1
Integration can have a similar effect upon consump­
tion. J. E. Meade evaluates the effects of changes in con­
sumption by comparing the ratios of the marginal utilities 
of products within individual countries in relation to 
domestic price ratios.^ in his example, Meade suggests 
that tariff reductions alter the ratios of marginal utility
M̂, 0. Clement, Richard Pfister, and Kenneth 
Eothwell, "The Theory of Customs Unions," Theoretical Is^es 
in International Economics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1967JT
p. i?d.
Ĵ. E. Meade, The Theory of Customs Unions (Amster­
dam: North Holland Publishing Company, 15^5/, PP» 44-52.
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and prices and, hence, increase living standards. For 
example, assume that country A produces good X, country B—  
good Y, and country C~good Z, and that country A maintains 
a tariff of 10 per cent, country B— 20 per cent, and coun­
try C--30 per cent. Assume now that countries A and B form 
a customs union. Before tariffs are removed, the ratio of 
the price of good Y to good X is greater in country A than 
in country B; that is, the price of good Y is raised in 
country A by the 10 per cent duty, and the price of good X 
is raised in country B by the 20 per cent tariff. When 
country A removes the duty on good Y, consumption (imports) 
of Y will probably increase. Therefore, the ratio of the 
marginal utility of Y to the marginal utility of X is 
reduced for country A. The favorable consumption effect 
occurs because consumers are enabled to adjust their con­
sumption to a lower price ratio. The degree to which this 
ratio is reduced would give some indication of the poten­
tial gain in living standards for country A.
Country B will undergo a similar effect for product 
X; however, the probable contraction of trade between coun­
try C and the union members will tend to dampen the consump­
tion gains between countries A and B. The overall signifi­
cance of the consumption effect will be largely dependent 
upon the elasticities of demand of union members for each 
other’s goods and by the union members for outside goods. 
Franz Gehrels suggests that the consumption effect of
— 17 —
economic integration is always positive and leads to an 
improvement in welfare.^
Benefits from integration may also occur because of 
dynamic considerations. These may accrue due to the shift 
in demand precipitated by tariff reductions. Firms can 
increase production efficiency because of large-scale econo­
mies, The advantages of a large market were recognized by
Adam Smith and have been elaborated on considerably by such
2contemporary authors as Rodan, Nurkse, and Scitovsky.
If there are, in reality, benefits of large-scale 
production, increased sales by firms in an integrated area 
will allow reductions in unit costs over a period of time. 
This cannot be expected to take place in the very short 
run; yet, there is every reason to believe that a sufficient 
time period will bring about more efficient operating con­
ditions, 3 Unfortunately, economic theory is not of much 
help in assessing the importance of large-scale economies. 
Empirical studies are incomplete and are subject to
^See Franz Gehrels, "Customs Unions from a Single 
Country Viewpoint," The Review of Economic Studies, XXIV,
No, 1 (1956-1957), pp. 6l-64,
%For examples, see; Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of 
Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (Oxford;
Basil Blackwell, 1953), Chapter 1; Tibor Scitovsky, "Two 
Concepts of External Economies," Journal of Political 
Economy. LXII (April, 195^), pp, 1A3-151» and Rosenstein 
Rodan, "The Problems of Industrialization in Eastern and 
South Eastern Europe," Economic Journal. LIII (19̂ 3), PP. 
202-211,
^Balassa, op, cit., Chapter 6.
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differing interpretations.^ Additional benefits may result 
from more intensive competition. The release of tariffs 
among the countries of an integration area will force firms 
to compete on a regional level as opposed to a national 
level. Increased competition will tend to bring about a 
more efficient utilization of resources.
It is also of importance to note that the overall 
growth potential of an integration area is enhanced through 
more investment opportunities. An enlarged market lessens 
uncertainty and presents a greater attraction to entrepre­
neurial talent than does the market of a single country.
Integration schemes which have reached the stage of 
a common market have an additional advantage. The free 
flow of the factors of production can equalize factor 
prices. That is, the total output of an integration area 
is increased with the same volume of inputs when labor and 
capital move from areas of low marginal productivity to 
areas of higher marginal productivity. The potentiality 
for further gains from factor movement is exhausted only 
after marginal productivities have become equalized in 
different areas. —
Imperfections of Economic Integration 
Economic integration may bring about some advan­
tages not possible within national entities. Yet, it must
^Clement, Pfister, and Hothwell, op, cit.. p. I99.
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be conceded that there are defects in integration which 
lessen the attractiveness of the system. There is little 
doubt that the biggest question mark in integration theory 
revolves around the subject of trade diversion versus trade 
creationo
It has been shown earlier in this chapter that the 
removal of tariffs may initially result in a positive pro­
duction effect. Should this occur, it connotates a movement 
toward a free trade position or a creation of trade— that 
is, a movement of purchases from a high-cost (national) to 
a low-cost (regional) source of supply. Jacob Viner has 
pointed out that economic integration may either bring 
about trade creation or it may cause trade diversion.^
Trade diversion is a shift in purchases from a low- 
cost to a high-cost source of supply or a shift in consump­
tion from countries external to an integration area to 
those inside an integration area. To demonstrate this, 
assume that countries A, B, and C produce a given product 
and that the respective unit costs are 25 dollars, 20 dol­
lars, and 15 dollars. Assume further that country A has a 
tariff of 7 dollars. Hence, country A imports the good 
from country C prior to union formation. Assume now that 
countries A and B form an integration area with a common 
external tariff of 7 dollars. Country A will subsequently
^Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (Mew York: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950), pp. 46-
51 o
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buy the product from country B at a cost of 20 dollars» 
Hence, trade is not created but, rather, diverted from 
country C to country B. Viner maintains that economic 
integration is desirable only in the case where trade ere- 
ation is greater than trade diversion.
Although his analysis is completely static in 
nature, Viner has correctly indicated that economic inte­
gration might not lead to an increase in world trade and 
welfare in spite of the removal of tariffs among member 
countries. He also elaborates on the complementarity or 
the competitiveness that exists among the members of an 
integration area. The greater the competition that exists 
among the member countries, the more trade will increase as 
a result of integration. That is, if there is a great deal 
of overlapping in the range of commodities manufactured and 
also significant differences in the cost of producing them,
the removal of barriers will cause a considerable increase
2in trade. On the other hand, countries which are comple­
mentary in nature will experience a relatively small 
increase in trade. J, E. Meade states that the trade bene­
fits of integration will be greatest if initially there is 
competition, but potentially there is complementarity,^
llbid,. p, 46,
Zibid.. p. 51.
3Meade, op. cit.. pp. 25-26,
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The issues of trade diversion versus trade creation 
and competitiveness versus complementarity are basic to the 
theory of economic integration. In the case of the European 
Economic Community, there would'appear to be net trade cre­
ation because there is a good deal of competition among the 
member countries. Much less clear, however, is the change 
in world trade to be expected from integration projects 
among developing economies» That is, the possibilities of 
a shift in consumption from a national high-cost producer 
to a regional low-cost source of supply would seem to be 
much less. For example, individual underdeveloped .countries 
import many industrial goods, most of which are not pro­
duced nationally. However, the formation of a customs 
union, which includes countries engaging in the production 
of manufactured goods, may cause imports to be diverted 
from outside sources to countries within the integration 
area. Such a shift in consumption from outside countries 
to countries within the region would be trade diversion.^
There seems to be little doubt that underdeveloped 
economies do not have as much to gain from integration as 
do the developed areas,^ However, it seems unreasonable
^At least one author has argued for trade creation 
in developing countries. See Raymond Mikesell, "The Theory 
of Common Markets as Applied to Regional Trading Arrange­
ments among Developing Economies," International Trade 
Theory in a Developing World, ed, Roy Harrod and D, C,
Hague (Londons Macmillan and Co., 1963), pp. 205-229»
Ŝee; R. L, Allen, "Integration in Less Developed 
Areas," Kyklos. XXV, Faso. 3 (1961), pp. 315™336; and
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to generalize that integration movements among developing 
areas are categorically undesirable because they do not 
meet the tests of current integration theory. Rather, each 
program of integration should be closely evaluated not only 
in terms of static integration theory, but also in terms of 
overall growth potential on a regional level as opposed to 
a national level.
h. Rationale for Integration among 
Developing Economies
Although the free trade doctrine is generally 
adhered to by most economists, the relevance of this theory 
to the developing areas hat been challenged. The princi­
ples of free trade have been given rebuttal by such writers 
as Prebisch and Myrdal,
It is the opinion of these authors that the compara­
tive cost concept is less relevant for developing countries 
than it is for developed economies. It is argued that the 
terms of trade have moved against the underdeveloped areas 
because of Engel’s law and an increase in efficiency in the 
consumption of raw materials. The low price elasticity of 
demand for primary products coupled with a high Income 
elasticity for industrial goods have caused a deterioration 
in the export sector of developing economies.^ Furthermore,
Gerald Meier, "Effects of a Customs Union on Economic Devel­
opment," Social and Economic Studies. IX, No. 1 (196O), pp. 
29-36.
-Raul Prebisch, "The Hole of commercial Policies In 
Underdeveloped Countries," Americsm Economic Association 
Proceedings. XLIX, No. 2 (1959), PP. 251-273.
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there is a backwash effect resulting from attempts to 
expand trade* Steadily deteriorating terms of trade tend 
to attract capital and resources away from nonindustrial 
areas.^
These authors hold that there are no natural laws 
which tend to pull developing countries out of the so-called 
vicious circle of poverty. However, each of the countries 
can pursue individual policies to initiate the development 
process. One suggested method is import substitution 
through the vehicle of a protective tariff.^
However, national development efforts have also 
proved unsatisfactory in many cases. Limited markets and 
resources combine to force a condition of protected ineffi­
ciency with little or no real growth taking place. One way 
to deal with this problem is to correct the restrictive 
aspects. Economic integration is one alternative approach 
since this would provide a larger market and make available 
additional resources. Thus, the development process could 
be initiated on a regional basis with the protection of a 
common external tariff.
Deriving Some Criteria for Integration 
among Less Developed Economies
Integration brings about a more rational pattern of 
trade and production than could exist on a national level,
^Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Regions (London: Duckworth and Co., 1957). Chapter 3.
^Prebisch, on. cit.. pp. 254—260.
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mainly because specialization is extended, to a region
rather than being oriented toward small narrow markets.
Trade diversion may occur, but as S. G. Lipsey indicates,
it is not correct to say that trade diversion is bad in all
cases.^ Professor Staffan Linder has given one example in
which trade diversion is preferable to trade creation.
To the extent that it ^rade diversionT" consists of 
diverting the importation of noninput goods away from 
advanced industrial countries, trade diversion is 
almost the very essence of the customs union postu­
lated. It enables the concentration of scarce for­
eign exchange on input imports, thereby enhancing 
capacity use and growth. The point of issue is not 
whether the new producer is more or less efficient 
than the former one. The question is, rather, 
whether it is not more advantageous 4;o buy a com­
modity from a new producer than to waste foreign 
exchange on importation from an advanced country.^
If integration allows the concentration of foreign 
exchange on capital equipment imports, the resulting trade 
diversionary effect may actually be a desirable phenomenon, 
Linder refers to this as efficient trade diversion.^ A 
customs union among developing economies has, therefore, a 
strategic attraction. It enables an underdeveloped country 
to maintain restrictions on noninput imports from industrial
R̂. G. Lipsey, "The Theory of Customs Unions: Trade
Diversion and Welfare," Economica. XXIV (February, 1957), 
p. 41.
2staffan B. Linder, "Customs Unions and Economic 
Development," Latin American Economic Integration, ed.




countries while enjoying the advantages of free trade with 
other less developed economies.^
The current body of integration theory is less 
applicable to developing countries than it is to developed 
areas. Although it is important to evaluate all integration 
movements in terms of integration theory, it also seems 
reasonable that integration movements in developing areas 
should be accorded an additional set of criteria. The most 
pertinent and critical criterion relates to the development 
of some sort of framework which is conducive to the accel­
eration of economic growth of less developed countries. If 
a particular economic integration program can significantly 
help to bring about the growth and development of its member 
countries, then there should be a prima facie case for such 
a movement.
As regards underdeveloped countries , . , the 
conventional theory simply misses the basic point.
Being designed to explore the problem of optimal 
allocation of resources, under given conditions of 
production, within a competitive framework, it 
cannot illuminate situations, such as those which 
arise in underdeveloped countries, in which neither 
resources nor conditions of production can be taken 
as given, and in which the mobility of factors of 
production obstructs the operation of market 
forces , o . . The primary question for any poten­
tial grouping of underdeveloped countries is whether 
discriminatory encouragement of trade with one another 
would tend to accelerate the rate of growth or not.2
llbld.. p. 38.
2sidney Dell, A Latin American Common Market? 
(London; Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. lé-17.
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However, there is much information to be collected 
and evaluated, as well as many theoretical contributions to 
be made, before one can concisely formulate the place of 
integration in the development framework. For example, 
does integration improve the climate for investment? What 
is the effect upon the regional balance of payments? What 
is the magnitude of the enlarged market, and can it be 
drawn away from the import sector? Will integration bring 
about economies of scale? Is the absolute volume of for­
eign exchange available for real capital imports signifi­
cantly higher or lower?
These are a few criteria which can be used to evalu­
ate integration projects in less developed areas. Because 
integration is viewed as a tool for development, each of 
the variables is directed toward the union members and not 
to the rest of the world. If these, as well as other 
factors important to the development process, are or may 
be affected positively, then a movement toward integration 
in a developing area should be seriously considered.
The efficiency and welfare of world resources 
should be considered mainly in a dynamic perspective. Even 
though comparative advantage is a static concept, it is sub­
ject to change over a period of time. Comparative costs 
change with man's ability to use and manipulate resources 
in a more efficient manner. Thus far, the only economies 
which have been able to accomplish this to any significant
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degree are the United States, West Europe or, more recently, 
Japan, Economic integration among developing economies 
offers an opportunity to extend comparative advantage to a 
regional level. Given a sufficient period of time along 
with the impetus of the increase in demand, regional spe­
cialization hopefully can be extended to an international 
plateau.
Summary
Economic integration is concerned with geographi­
cally discriminatory changes in tariff barriers. It does 
not bring about a condition of free trade but causes the 
relaxation of tariffs between the members of an economic 
union. Integration can consist of several different stages. 
These stages attempt to delineate the different possible 
degrees of economic unity. The attainment of each of the 
successive steps is largely determined by the willingness 
of member countries to give up national sovereignty.
Economic integration purports to bring about various 
benefits but also has significant disadvantages. The pro­
duction and consumption of union members can be positively 
affected, both on a static and a dynamic level. Moreover, 
the enlarged market provides a better atmosphere for invest­
ment, and the free flow of the factors of production can 
increase production efficiency of member countries. The 
main disadvantage of economic union centers around the
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initial impact of integration on world trade. Those move- 
ments which are characterized by trade diversion as opposed 
to trade creation are typically considered as undesirable.
Contemporary integration theory appears to have 
limited applicability to the developing areas. These move­
ments should be considered less in terms of the static effect 
on world welfare and more in terms of the impetus which they 
can have on the growth and development of the participating 
economies. Relevant criteria for integration in developing 
areas should include such economic factors as the magnitude 
of the change in demand, the existence of economies of 
large-scale production, the effect of the union on the 
regional balance of payments, the attraction of new invest­
ment, and the availability of foreign exchange for real 
capital imports. Very little is known about the impact of 
integration on economic development, and there is ample 
room for many theoretical and empirical contributions.
Underdeveloped countries have limitations, both on 
the demand and supply sides of their economies. Integra­
tion constitutes an attempt to stimulate demand and, sub­
sequently, to induce capital formation on a regional level. 
The impact of integration on world efficiency and welfare 
should be considered over the long run in a dynamic 
perspective.
CHAPTER III 
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 
Introduction
There is perhaps no better example of a need for 
economic integration among developing countries than In the 
small Isthmus of Central America. One of the most striking 
features of these countries is that they are small in vir­
tually all respects. Considered Individually, the terri­
torial dimensions of the Central American countries range 
from 8,000 to 50,000 square miles. The size of the popula­
tions varies between 1.5 and 4.5 million people, and^the 
magnitude of purchasing power ranges from 500 million to 
slightly over one billion dollars. One author states that 
the achievement of significant economies of scale requires 
a market of between 10 to 15 million p e o p l e .  ̂ No Individual 
country in Central America approaches this figure; yet, when 
viewed as a unit, the magnitude of the population and total
.  —   ■ ■ ■ I I H I ■ !  -      . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I    -    I ■ ■ ■ !    ■ — ■ ■ ■ I  " I " —  ! ■ ■ ■  I ^ 1 1  I  I
^Carlos M. Castillo, Growth and Integration in Cen­
tral America (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1966), p. 71.
Ê. A. Robinson, (ed.), Economic Consequences of the 
Size of Nations. Proceedings of Conference held by Inter­
national Economic Association (London: Macmillan and Co.,
i960), pp. xvli-xviii.
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purchasing power constitute a more desirable climate for 
economic development.
The Isthmus of Central America existed as a federal 
republic after it obtained its independence from Spain in 
1821. However, the area was not at that time, nor did it 
become, economically and politically unified. Due to poor 
transportation connections and geographic separatism, the 
federation disintegrated by 1840, dividing into five sepa­
rate countries including Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, and Costa Rica^ (See Map 1).
During the period from 1840-1950, each of the coun­
tries followed policies supposedly conducive to the develop­
ment of the individual states. Development proceeded 
erratically and was marked by çonsiderable instability.
Early in the 1950’s under the leadership of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), negotiations began for 
the reconstruction of _Centrai American unity. These nego­
tiations sought the consolidation of national markets and 
their gradual formation into a single economic unit.
The goal of the Central American integration plan 
is the attainment of a common market. It is an example 
of an attempt to utilize integration as a mechanism for 
economic development. The goals of the coalition not only 
center around the release of tariff barriers, but also are
^Castillo, OP. cit.. pp. 1-8.
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MAP 1








SOURCE: Ambassador World Atlas
(Maplewood, New Jersey: C. 8. Sammond
and Company, 1956), p, 96.
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characterized by various policies and programs specifically 
aimed at regional growth and development.
This chapter consists of a description and evaluation 
of this integration scheme. Following a short synopsis of 
the economy of Central America, information is presented on 
the institutional framework of the Common Market. The 
increases in regional trade since the inception of integra­
tion are also considered. Emphasis is placed upon the effect 
of the Common Market on the level of economic activity in 
each of the member countries and the region as a whole.
The Central American Economy 
The majority of the people of the isthmus reside in 
the southeastern Guatemala highlands, the north coast and 
interior valleys of Honduras, the Pacific littoral of Nica­
ragua, the central plateau of Costa Rica, and throughout 
El Salvador. The Pacific side contains the largest amount 
of inhabitants and the greatest degree of economic activity. 
The rate of population growth for the years 1950-1960 of 
approximately 3.4 per cent is among the highest in the 
world. Racially, Central Americans are highly varied. 
One-half of Guatemala’s population is Indian. Costa Ricans 
are unique for their high percentage of Caucasian blood.
More generally, the population is mixed Indian-white with 
traces of Negro blood.^
Guatemala, Permanent Secretariat of the General 
Treaty of central American Integration, The Central Ameri- 
oan Common Market. II (Guatemala, December, 19&4), p. 11.
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The economy of the area depends upon agriculture 
much as it did during the Colonial Era. More than two-thirds 
of the 13 million people gain their livelihood by farming. 
Agriculture contributes 37 per cent of the gross product and 
brings in 90 per cent of the export revenue. Three products 
(bananas, coffee, and cotton) earn over 80 per cent of for­
eign exchange.1 These crops are grown on the best land in 
each of the countries but provide little food for the popu­
lation. Consequently, the import sector is heavily concen­
trated with basic consumer staples. In an average year, 
consumer goods make up more than 50 per cent of total 
imports. Many parts of the economy exist only on a sub­
sistence level and depend upon the very basic commodities 
of beans, squash, and maize.
Although there is considerable attention given to 
its development, the manufacturing sector of Central America 
is minute. Most industrial goods are imported. In Guate­
mala, for example, the main industrial activity is food 
processing although there are a number of small cottage-type 
manufacturing units. El Salvador is the most industrialized 
of the group. Its chief industry is cotton textiles. Hon­
duras, the least industrialized country, only employs 6 per 
cent of the population in this sector. Nicaragua, which is 
almost as weak, concentrates on food and lumber processing.
^Robert West and John Augelli, Middle America: Its
Lands and Peonies (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1900), p. 383.
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Although some success has been encountered in Costa Rica, 
manufacturing accounts for only 13 per cent of GNP, In 
the central highlands of Costa Rica, there are food- 
processing plants, textile mills, and shoe and clothing 
manufacturers.
As a general mile, apart from the relatively wide­
spread handicrafts fî mis, Central American industry is 
characterized by small firms producing consumer goods. The 
limits and subdivisions of the market have hampered growth 
and economic operations for even small industries with low 
capital requirements.2 The incipient stage of industrial 
development and the low productivity of most agricultural 
endeavors have combined to bring about a heavy reliance on 
the foreign sector. The availability of foreign exchange 
is almost exclusively dependent upon the sales of coffee, 
bananas, and cotton. Both the inelasticities of demand and 
supply for these products contribute to the economic insta­
bility of the Central American area.
Tables 1 and 2 indicate the absolute and the rela­
tive economic positions of each of the member countries. In 
terms of gross national product, Guatemala is significantly 
better off than the remaining members. On a per capita
^Ibid.. Chapter 13»
O t i^Naciones Unidas, Comision Economica Para America 
Latina, Comité de Cooperaciôn Econémica del Istmo Centro- 
americano. La Integracion Econémica de Centroamerica 
(E/CN.12/422, November, 1956) (New York, 1956), P. 4.
TABLE 1
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT FOR FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES, ANNUALLY, 1957-1966 
(In millions of dollars 
converted at fixed 
exchange rates)
Year Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica
1957 933.0 530.7 343.5 345.1 352.11958 962.0 552.0 358.0 347.4 380.9
1959 983.0 532.8 374.5 351.1 396.5i960 1010.0 564.4 389.5 355.4 419.91961 1031.0 575.2 396.5 378.5 434.1
1962 1080.0 641.6 418.5 412.7 474.6
1963 1200.0 678.0 434.0 466.5 516.81964 1311.0 747.6 466.5 513.7 551.5
1965. 1316.0 794.4 504.0 570.8 595.11966®’ 1379.0 854.0 536.0 633.5
'̂Figures for the year I966 were not available for Nicaragua*
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
XX, No, 3 (March, 1967)5 International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. XXI, No, 2 (February, I968).
TABLE 2
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA FOR FIVE CENTRAL 
AMÎBICAN COUNTRIES, ANNUALLY, 1957-1966 
(In hundreds of dollars converted 
at fixed exchange rates)
Year Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica
1957 270 234 203 263 342
1958 271 237 208 261 352
1959 269 223 208 254 350i960 265 230 205 251 3591961 265 228 200 261 356
1962 266 244 202 275 374
1963 287 250 202 303 3851964 304 265 211 321 397
1965. 296 271 221 346 4151966* 301 280 227 — — 425
VjJos
^Figures for the year I966 were not available for Nicaragua.
SOURCE: Adapted from International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. XX, No. 3 (March, I967); International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics. XXI, No. 2 (February, I968).
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basis, however, Costa Rica is the most advanced economy. 
Usually, the countries show a small increase each year in 
GNP, However, none has been able to incur a sustained 
growth in per capita GNP, except during the last four- to 
six-year period. In an absolute sense, the level of eco­
nomic activity in each of the countries is small. In fact, 
the combined output of the entire region only approximates 
that of the small country of Israel, The chances for cre­
ating a viable economic unit within such small national 
territories are severely limited.
The Common Market : Background and Organization
The movement toward integration in Central America 
began in 1951 when various bilateral trade agreements were 
developed for the purpose of increasing regional trade. In 
1952, the Central American Economic Cooperation Committee 
was created. Its purpose was to undertake a program of 
gradual and progressive integration of the Central American 
economy,^ A significant advancement was made in 1955 when 
the Central American Research Institute for Industry (ICAITI) 
was established, ICAITI was conceived in order to promote 
and foster industrial growth and productivity throughout 
Central America,^
^The Central American Common Market, p. 22,
^Central American Research Institute for Industry 
(Guatemala City: ICAITI, /p.dj/),
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In 1958, a trade document called the Multilateral 
Treaty on Free Trade and Central American Integration was 
signed by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
Through this treaty, th^ member states granted each other 
free trade of many products originating in the respective 
national territories. The ultimate objective— a free trade 
association— was to evolve in ten years,^
Also in 1958, the Agreement on the Regime of Inte­
gration Industries was devised for the purpose of building 
large- and medium-sized industries in Central America (See 
Chapter IV). The idea of industrial growth in the integra­
tion area was considered to be equally as important as the 
free flow of trade. Hence, an industrial agreement arose 
simultaneously with the removal of tariff duties.
The Multilateral Treaty was superseded by the 
General Treaty of Economic Integration in I96O. Initially 
signed by Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras, 
this agreement was more encompassing than the first treaty.
It granted the right of free trade to all Central American 
products, except those specifically enumerated in the treaty. 
This meant that per cent of all items listed on the Cen­
tral American tariff schedule were immediately entitled to 
free trade. Costa Rica accepted the new treaty in I963,
^The Central American Common Market, p. 22,
pRoger D, Hansen, Central America: Regional Inte­
gration and Economic Development. Studies in Development 
Progress, No, 1 (New York: National Planning Association,
October, 196?), p, 27.
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The General Treaty also created the main legal insti­
tutions of the Common Market. The Economic Council, composed 
of the ministers of economy, is the final authority for the 
negotiation of agreements. The Executive Council, consist­
ing of the vice ministers of economy, acts as the working 
body for all legal considerations. Under the direction of 
both the Economic and the Executive Councils is the Perma­
nent Secretariat (SIECA). Created in 1961, the Permanent 
Secretariat acts as the statistical and implementational 
organ of the General Treaty and handles the technical work­
load of the higher councils.^
The Central American Convention on the Equalization 
of Import Tariffs was developed in conjunction with the 
General Treaty. The common external tariff is being nego­
tiated under the auspices of this agreement. Also, the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) was 
formally inaugurated in I96I. This organization was con­
ceived specifically to promote the process of integration.
Its leading activities are to be concentrated in five gen­
eral areas— infrastructure, long-term investment projects, 
agriculture, structural readjustment, and other activities 
of regional importance. A capital subscription of k million 
dollars by each of the five member countries provided the 
bank with its initial assets. In 1964, the U.S. Agency for
^Ibid.. p. 26.
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International Development announced a loan of 10 million, 
raising the capitalization of the bank to 26 million 
dollars.1
Also in 1961, in order to encourage intra-Central 
American trade, a regional clearing house was created. This 
institution is aimed at facilitating the settlement of inter­
country monetary balances arising from trade. Under this 
arrangement, each central bank is obliged to grant up to 
$500,000 in automatic credits to other banks in the Common 
Market.2
Thus, the basic foundation for the market was laid 
during the period from 1958 to I96I. The General Treaty was 
the prime mover since it provided the framework for integra­
tion and paved the way for the addition of other important 
agreements. Accordingly, Ceptral America witnessed the 
development of various institutions concerned with regional 
integration. In this respect, as well as others, the Cen­
tral American Program has been successful; in fact, it is 
now the most comprehensive integration movement in the 
underdeveloped world.
Achievements of the Central American Common Market
Stage of Integration
The Central American movement is referred to as a 
"common market." Even though one observes the union in this
D̂ell, op. cit.. p. 26.
%ansen, op. cit.. p. 26.
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perspective, there is substantiel progress yet to be made 
before the theoretical conditions of a true common market 
are fulfilled. However, the first stage of integration—  
the free trade association— has virtually been attained.
The moment the General Treaty went into effect, over per 
cent of all the items listed on the tariff schedule were 
entitled to free trade. During the next five years (19&1- 
1966), another 20 per cent was released so that approxi­
mately 94 per cent of the items of regional trade is 
exempted from tariff duties*^
The level of free intraregional trade is unlikely 
to reach 100 per cent in the near future. There are certain 
products which each of the countries will not set loose, 
either because these products bring in considerable tariff 
revenue or because the individual countries are determined 
to protect them from external competition. For example, 
each of the members is committed to the development of oil 
refining. Consequently, none of them wants to open these 
products to free trade since a low-cost producer would drive 
the less efficient producers out of business.
Central America is equally as close to the level of 
a customs union. By the end of I966, uniform external tar­
iffs had been negotiated for nearly 98 per cent of the items 
on the tariff schedule. This high percentage is somewhat 
misleading because the remaining items represent about 30
^Ibid., p, 25.
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per cent of total imports and between 25 and 4-5 per cent of 
total customs revenue.^ Since the member countries depend 
heavily on tariffs fpr government revenue, the remaining 
2 per cent of customs duties are likely to be eliminated 
rather slowly.
Relative to other integration movements. Central 
America is close to all of the requisites of a customs 
union. The stage of a common market, however, is not within 
the immediate realm of possibility. There are, as yet, no 
regional programs oriented toward encouraging the free flow 
of the factors of production. The existence of a heavy 
Indian population and Negro elements in certain parts of 
Central America will deter factor mobility. As a conse­
quence, Central America is technically not a "common 
market." It is, in reality, a customs union. Advancements 
beyond this level are practically inconceivable for at 
least an additional decade.
Changes in Intraregional Trade 
Trade among Central American countries has increased 
with great rapidity during the first years of the Common 
Market, Table 3 presents data on regional suid total imports 
for member countries during the period from 19^0 to 1965» 
Column 1 indicates that intraregional trade has increased 
substantially— in fact, by 316 per cent over the period
" ' ■■ I II       ■■■■'■' 'I " I" F" '......... ......... ....... ....
D̂ell, op, cit.. p. 58.
TABLE 3
RBGIONÜi AND TOTAL IMPORTS OF FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES, ANNUALLY, I96O-I965 







(3)Per Cent of Intra- 
Central American 
Imports to Total 
Imports
i960 $32.7 $514.2 6.4*
1961 36.8 495.9 7.4
1962 50,8 552.1 9.3
1963 72.1 651.6 10.2
1964 106,4 769.0 13.7
1965 136.0 867.8 15.6
SOURCE: Adapted from Guatemala, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General
de Integration Economica Centroamericana, Anuario Estadlstloo Centroamericano de 
Comeroio Exterior (Guatemala, October 12, 196è), p. 22,
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under consideration. The percentage of regional imports 
to total imports shown in Column 3 also has improved 
although it is still low.
The most spectacular growth in apea trade has been 
in industrial goods. Industrial trade increased 530 per 
cent from approximately 15 million to 98 million dollars in 
five years’ time. Agricultural goods increased by 108 per 
cent or from 16 million to 35 million dollars,^ The magni­
tude of the trade increase in Central America has been 
particularly impressive, especially in industrial goods. 
Since this change in trade occurred over such a short period 
of time, it appears that previously idle capacity was placed 
into operation. The time period was not long enough to 
significantly augment productive capacity.
Economic Growth ip Central America 
Since the inception of the Common Market, there has 
been a noticeable change in the rate of growth of all coun­
tries, both on the basis of GNP and GNP per capita. The 
growth rates brought out in Table 4 verify this phenomenon. 
This table indicates the gpowth of GNP and GNP per capita 
for two separate time periods— 1957-1961 and 1962-1966,
Since the Common Market was not well underway until I96I,
Table 4 should provide some information about the impact of
economic integration on the rate of growth,
I  — I I I  I   I I  immiM»mMmm< . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
^Hansen, o p , oit,. p. 34,
TABLE 4
GROWTH RATES OP GNP AND GNP PER CAPITA 
































®'Data for I966 were not available for Nioareigua.
SOURCE* Computed from International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. XXI, No, 2 (February, 1968).
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Daring the period 1957-1961, increases in GNP were 
registered for each of the countries* However, a trans­
lation of these figures into a per capita fiamework indi­
cates that no positive change occurred, except in the case 
of Costa Rica. Generally speaking, the growth in output 
did not quite keep pace with the population.
On the other hand, the figures for the period from 
1962-1966 reveal a significant growth rate not only in GNP 
but also in GNP per capita. All countries, with the excep­
tion of Honduras, registered unusually large growth rates.
The rate of growth was particularly pronounced for Nicaragua, 
The integration area easily achieved the Alliance for Pro­
gress goal of a 2.5 per cent increase in per capita income. 
Moreover, this was accomplished in spite of a population 
growth rate of 3,4 per cent, which, incidently, surpasses 
by a considerable margin the Latin American average of 2.8 
per cent.
Foreign private investment has noticeably increased 
since the development of the Common Market. Table 5 attempts 
to show the impact of the Common Market on foreign private 
investment by presenting investment figures for selected 
years before and after the incidence of economic integration.
According to International Monetary Fund statistics, 
the investment inflow into the Common Market changed sub­
stantially after i960, more than doubling between I962 and 
1965. The percentage of foreign private investment to total
TABLE 5
FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA, 
SELECTED YEARS. 1956-1966 
(In millions of dollars)
1956 1958 i960 1962 1964 1965 1966
Guatemala 10.9 17.2 19.4 16.7 39.6 42.8 5.8
El Salvador -1.3 5.7 9.6 12.1 27.8 17.3 14.8
Honduras -.6 -.7 -7.9 2.9 7.6 11.1 6.6
Nicaragua .2 .7 .8 2.4 2.3 3.7 2.8
Costa Rica .6 .6 .7 3.2 2.0 5.0 4.3
Total 9.8 22.3 22.6 37.3 79.3 79.9 34.3
Per Cent of Total 
Private Investment®" ___ 7.5* 7.3# 11.9* 18.1* 16.4*
•SJ
'̂Insufficient data for the years 1956 and 1966.
SOURCE: Adapted from International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics. XX, No. 12 {December, 196?); International Monetary Fund, Intemat 1 onal 
Financial Statistics. XXI, No, ^ (April, I968).
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private investment also improved, increasing from 7.5 per 
cent in 1958 to 16,4 per cent in 1965. It reached a peak
of 18,1 per cept in 1964.
Individual country figures reveal that Guatemala 
and El Salvador have been the most successful in attracting 
foreign capital. These countries have the largest indus­
trial complexes and the largest markets of Central America.
Significant increases were also experienced by each of the 
remaining countries. However, foreign investment for the 
year 1966 perceptibly decreased. This is almost entirely 
due to the reduction in the case of Guatemala. Increased 
political uncertainty in this country may have been a factor 
in the decline.
The Central American Bank for Economic Integration 
has also helped to increase economic activity. During I96I- 
1967, the bank approved a total loan volume of 92.0 million 
dollars. Of this amount, 42,8 million was used for indus­
trial investment and 33.  ̂million for infrastructure 
projects,1
During the years in which the Common Market has been 
in effect, the level of economic activity has noticeably 
increased in Central America. It is not possible to attri­
bute all of this growth directly to the integration program. 
Yet, it seems reasonable to conclude that during I96O-I966,
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     I  I I  ' —  ■ ■ ■   —  "  ' ■ ■ ■  ' I
, Ŝec]petaria Permanente del Tratado General de Inte- 
gracion Economica Centreamericana, Carta Informâtiva. A 
Monthly Report Prepared by 3IECA, No, 66 (Guatemala City: 
SIECA, April 12, I967), pp, 25-26,
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the Common Market has acted as a stimulus to economic 
advancement,^ In spite of this success, it is too early 
to offer definitive Judgments on the effect of integration 
on economic growth and development. The next five- to 
seven-year period should permit a more tangible statement 
about a possible cause-and-effect relationship between 
integration and growth in Central America,
Summary
Central America has historically based its economic 
livelihood upon the exports of coffee, cotton, and bananas. 
The Central American economy is characterized by a small 
industrial complex and a large dependence upon subsistence 
agriculture. In certain areas of the isthmus, there is 
considerable population pressure although, in terms of 
total available land, the absolute number of people is not 
excessive.
Since World War II, most of the countries have 
attempted to develop internally through import substitution. 
However, early in the 1950*s, economic separatism began to 
give way to economic integration. Integration first became 
a reality in 1958, but only on a limited basis. The 
General Treaty for Economic Integration, signed in i960,
^Early reports indicate that Central America has 
encountered problems during I966-1967. Growth rates have 
slowed, and there is a regional balance-of-payments deficit. 
See "Central American Common Market," World Business 
(January, I968), pp, l4-l6.
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actually constitutes the implementational tool for a far 
reaching program of integration among the five member 
countries.
The development of the institutional framework 
closely pursued the integration movement. This includes 
such organizations as the Permanent Secretariat (SIECA), 
the research organ (ICAITI), the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration (CABEI), and a regional clearing house 
to finance trade among Common Market countries.
The integration scheme has reached the stage of a 
customs union. A high percentage of trade is not subject 
to restrictions, and the common external tariff is near com­
pletion. The first years of integration were marked by an 
impressive increase in regional trade. From 1960-1965 
trade increased 316 per cent, the largest change taking 
place in industrial goods. During the same period, the 
growth of the region progressed well, both on the basis of 
GNP and GNP per capita. Nicaragua led all other countries 
with a growth in GNP of 11,0 per cent and GNP per capita 
of 8.0 per cent. There was also a noticeable increase in 
the inflow of capital from abroad.
Overall, it appears that the integration movement 
has been instrumental in bringing about a more conducive 
atmosphere for economic development. However, the full 
impact of integration upon the Central American economy 
will not be known for a number of years.
CHAPTER IV
AN ANALYSIS AND HISTORY OP THE INTEGRATION 
INDUSTRIES SCHEME
Introduction
The success of the Common Market during its early 
years of operation has brought about a tendency to neglect 
the less effective portions of the integration movement.
It is misleading to give the impression that the idea of 
regional growth is firmly imbedded in the Central American 
economy. It is, in fact, true that the Common Market is 
permeated with conflicts of interest. Individual countries 
do not tend to stress the growth of the region but rather 
the progress which takes place within the respective 
national territories. Numerous documents have given con­
siderable publicity to the accomplishments of the Common 
Market, Much less investigation has probed those areas 
which have met with difficulty.
One of the main problems which characterizes inte- 
gration in less developed areas is reciprocity and balanced 
development. In Central America, this is particularly 
apparent in "regional" efforts to promote industrializa­
tion, Although national development programs have attracted
— 51 ~
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significant small-scale industrial activity, especially in 
the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador, regional endeavors 
have met with little tangible success. One of the weakest 
elements in the regional framework is the Integration Indus­
tries Scheme,
A basic description and analysis of the theoretical 
and practical aspects of this scheme is the major objective 
of this chapter. Information on the goals of the program, 
the designation process, and the regulatory process is pre­
sented, Also presented is a historical survey of the scheme 
during the period from 1958-1967*
Agreement on the Regime of 
Integration Indu striesi
In order to develop a program of industrialization 
in Central America to supplement the trade movement, the 
five member countries began early negotiations to derive an 
agreement or treaty to begin to ezpand the industrial base. 
All of the members were concerned about the low level of 
industrial activity in the Central American area. The 
internal structure of industry registered few significant 
changes over the preceding decades and continued to rest
^The concept of integration "industries" is some­
what misleading. Technically, these are integration plants 
or, at best, integration firms. It is true that these 
plants or firms will often constitute the industry. For 
that reason, the terms "industry," "firm," and "plant" will 
be used interchangeably in this study.
" 53 ■"
mainly upon a few traditional activities— food, beverages, 
tobacco, clothing, textiles, wood, and furniture,^
A successful program of industrialization is 
partially dependent upon large internal markets. Industry 
flourishes the most wherever consumption of Industrial 
goods is maintained at a high level. The countries of 
Central America have definite demand limitations within 
each of their internal markets. This factor has been 
stressed considerably by ECLA, The Commission believes, 
however, that the entire Central American area could con­
ceivably be large enough to merit a movement toward indus­
trialization. It was with this factor in mind that ECIA 
proposed what it refers to as "industrias integradas” or 
integrated industries.^
On June 10, 1958, the governments of Central America 
drew up the Integration Industries Treaty. This treaty 
turned out to be a simplified draft which set forth the 
principles which were to guide Central American industrial
^Economic Commission for Latin America, "Central 
America: Industrial Policy Problems," Economic Bulletin
for Latin America. IX, No, 1 (1964), p. 119,
^Although used often in literature, the phrase 
"integrated" industries is technically not correct. The 
industries in question are not integrated in the usual 
sense of the word, either vertically or horizontally.
They are instead merely "integration" industries which 
simply connotates industries which operate under the privi­
leges of the treaty. The fact that they are referred to in 
the treaty as "industrias de integraciôn" rather than "indus- 
trias integradas" confirms this interpretation. Henceforth, 
the author shall use the more correct usage.
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Integration. The development of specific industries to be 
incorporated unde? the scheme was to be determined on an 
individual basis and would be the subject of additional 
protocols.
Theoretical Considerations of the Treaty
The basic motif of this treaty centers around Arti­
cle II, which states:
Central American integration industries shall be 
considered to be those industries which, in the crite­
ria of the Central American Commission for Industrial 
Integration, are comprised of one or more plants, the 
minimum capacity of which requires access to the Cen­
tral American Market in order to operate under reason­
ably economic and competitive conditions.!
This article contains the basic theory which perme­
ates the entire treaty. This is not a new and unexpected 
development of integration theory but rather is a direct 
attempt to apply one of the most important benefits to be 
gained from any economic integration movement— namely, the 
advantages of the increased size of a market. Many indus­
tries, even of a medium-sized nature, cannot attract suffi­
cient demand to become efficient within the confines of 
any one of the Central American countries. On the other 
hand, the combined demand of all five countries provides a 
better possibility for increasing sales and bringing about
^Guatemala, Agency for International Development, 
ROCAP, Regional Office for Central America and Panama, 
Economic Integration Treaties of Central America (Guatemala, 
i960). Article II, p. 21, "The Agreement on theRegime of 
Central American Integrated Industries.”
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economies of large-scale production. The lowering of per 
unit costs, in theory, would allow a reasonable profit 
margin and, subsequently, lower prices for consumers.
Some aspects of the preceding quotation are not 
sufficiently clear. Although the incidence of lower prices 
is implicit in such a theory and is of much concern to eco­
nomists, one is really not sure that the officials were con­
sidering this possibility, especially in view of a permanent 
common tariff to the outside^ and the typical reluctance of 
firms to lower product prices.
The addition of the word "competitive" in the last 
line of the quotation is also confusing. Apparently, this 
refers to outside competition because the agreement calls 
for, at least initially, one plant to operate within the 
confines of the entire market. If so, it assumes that the 
external tariff will not be too high to completely discour­
age foreign competition.
Also fundamental to the theory supporting integra­
tion industries is an efficient utilization of the limited 
resources available in Central America. According to ECLA, 
the creation of integration industries will avoid duplication 
of investments and unutilized capacity.% This connotates a
llbid.. Art, III, p, 22.
^Joseph Pincus, El Mercado Comun Centroamericano 
(Guatemala: Agenda Para Desarrollo Intemacional, Ofieina
Regional Para Asuntos de Centroamerica y Panama ̂ OCA^,
June, 1963), p. 39.
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complementary growth of the industrial "base and an efficient 
use of existing resources as opposed to an excessive number 
of firms producing similar products with none of them being 
able to operate at full capacity. It is argued that one 
plant is often all that is needed and, indeed, all that the 
Common Market can support.
This is a detailed and purposeful attempt at planned 
industrial development. It proposes to promote industry on 
a fifm-by-firm basis in accordance with production possibili­
ties and regional demand. In addition, it is characterized 
by balanced industrial development; that is, integration 
plants are to be evenly allocated among all countries. In 
fact, a temporary article is written into the treaty which 
states that a second plant cannot be designated to any one 
country until all of the other members have received at 
least one integration plant,^ This restrictive clause was 
no doubt founded on the fear of Nicaragua and Honduras that 
most of the integration plants would be located in the more 
industrialized areas of Guatemala and El Salvador,
The treaty does not list the products which fall 
into the realm of integration industries. Studies of ECLA, 
however, state that there are mainly eleven areas of inter­
est, These are petroleum refining, fertilizers, insecti­
cides, pharmaceutical products, tires and tubes, paints.
^Economic Integration Treaties of Central America.
p, 25.
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ceramics and glass products, plastics, fish products, cotton 
products, and wood products.^
Integration industries are established regional 
monopolies protected from external competition. The Inte­
gration Industries Scheme is, therefore, subject to all the 
abuses which can result from market power. These potential 
abuses have influenced the attitude of the United States 
government toward the Integration Industries Scheme, The 
U.S. has made it clear that it does not support a program 
which has such direct monopolistic inclinations,^
The Economic Commission for Latin America, as well 
as the member countries, realize the monopolistic character 
of this program. It is for this reason that the benefits 
and regulations associated with the scheme are spelled out 
in each of the protocols designating integration industries.
Benefits of Integration Industries 
In order to make this program attractive to pros­
pective investors, the Integration Industries Agreement 
stipulated various advantages which would be available to 
those firms operating under the auspices of this system,
^Pincus, OP, cit,, p, 40,
^Representative Martha W, Griffiths, Economic 
Policies and Programs in Middle America. A Report to the 
Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of 
the Joint Economic Committee (Washington, U.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 19,63), p, 26,
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Tariff protection against Imports. In Central 
America, as In most developing areas, the most popular 
route of Industrialization Is through Import substitution. 
Each Individual country of Central America has been very 
careful to protect Its Infant Industries. Integration 
Industries also operate along the lines of Import substi­
tution; that is, protection from outside competition Is 
provided not only In the country of origin but throughout 
the entire Central American market.̂  The products of the 
Integration plant are allowed to flow to the other Central 
American countries without an Intraregional tariff barrier, 
and they also receive the protection of a common tariff to 
the outside. This Is In agreement with the so-called theory 
of customs unions.
Protection from competition within the Common Market. 
There exists the possibility that certain of the Individual 
countries may have sufficient markets to attract the devel­
opment of Industries which are competitive with an Integra­
tion Industry. The Common Market cannot dictate the actions 
taken on a national level to promote economic development. 
The entry of competitive firms would be unlikely 
after an Integration fliin absorbed regional demand and 
enhanced production efficiency. However, such an occurrence
^Guatemala, Agency for International Development, 
ROCAP, Regional Office for Central America and Panama, 
Economic Integration Treaties of Central America (Guatemala, 
1966), Article XXVl, p. 33, "Protocol to the Agreement on 
the Regime of Central American Integration Industries."
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is possible before a firm becomes well established in the 
Common Market.^ In the event that this does occur, the 
Integration Industries Agreement provides for a special 
system which benefits the integration firm. That is, inte­
gration industries are granted tariff protection from com­
petitive firms producing within the Common Market, However, 
the tariff on such products is to be reduced by 10 per cent 
each year. Hence, competitive products would be subject to 
free trade after a period of ten years,^
^This possibility has become a reality in the case 
of tires and tubes (See Page 80),
^"Protocol to the Agreement on the Regime of Central 
American Integration Industries,” op. cit.. Art. Ill, p. 2?. 
Close analysis of the preceding benefit will reveal a con­
flict between the existence of integration industries and 
regional free trade. The granting of free trade privileges 
to the products of integration plants is an extension of 
the trade movement. Yet, it is also true that products of 
a competitive nature would be delayed in increments for a 
period of ten years. It is, therefore, possible that the 
Integration Industries Agreement could be a restrictive 
influence on free trade. In view of this. Article I of 
thé first protocol states that:
The benefits of the Convention on the System of 
Central American Integration Industries will not 
restrict or limit the commercial interchange taking 
place under the protection of the General Treaty of 
Central American Economic Integration.
This has the effect of preventing those firms pro­
ducing products already subject to free trade from becoming 
integration industries. As a consequence, integration indus­
tries will mostly constitute new products which have not been 
accepted for free trade or which have been accepted but have 
never been traded. This does not present an extreme diffi­
culty because there are certainly many industries which are 
not yet established in Central America, See Andrew Wardlaw, 
"The Operations of the Central American Common Market," 
(unpublished report. Agency for International Development, 
Washington, D,C., August, 1966), pp, 59-60, (Mimeographed.)
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Protection against dumping. In the event that 
unfair practices develop among foreign exporters of com­
petitive products, such as selling at prices lower than 
normal or lower than regular prices on the International 
market, the Integration firms are protected by the sus­
pension of all Imports which are engaged In these 
practices.1
Imports of raw materials. Another Important advan­
tage of the Integration Industries Is found In Article VI 
of the first protocol. Integration plants are to enjoy, 
for a period of ten years, total exemption of duties on 
the Importation of raw materials and Intermediate products 
utilized In the production of the commodities which have
pIntegration status. Since many production Inputs are 
Imported by developing economies, this factor Is not of 
Insignificant Importance In lowering production costs. It 
Is understood, however, that the Integration plants are to 
use Central American materials If and when these are avail­
able. Although this clause Is not to be found In writing 
anywhere In the treaty or Its protocols, It Is apparently 
Implicitly assumed that firms will use Central American 
products whenever possible.
Article VI further provides that Integration plants 
are to be exempt from taxes on production or consumption of
^"Protocol to the Agreement on the Regime of Central 
American Integration Industries," op. cit.. Art. VIII, p. 27.
^Ibld.. Art. VI, p. 27.
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imported raw materials or intermediate products,^ If 
national governments have separate laws with respect to 
these taxes, the integration industries are to be reim­
bursed for any amount paid. The Central American Agree­
ment on Fiscal Incentives, which has not as. yet gone into 
effect, has similar privileges for new plants, but even 
this liberal document allows similar exemptions for a 
period of only five years.
The benefits received by a firm operating under the 
Integration Industries Scheme are seemingly more than enough 
to attract many entrepreneurs. If one adds to this the fact 
that each integration industry is, at least temporarily, an 
ordained monopoly, this scheme should prove attractive to 
prospective investors. However, the proponents of this 
program realize the significant market power which could be 
exerted by an integration industry. As a result, the pro­
tocols, in addition to listing the advantages of the inte­
gration industries, also postulate a number of special 
requirements and restrictions— many of which make the pro­
gram less attractive.
Obligations of Integration Industries
Initial plant capacity. One of the main benefits 
of the Integration Industries Scheme centers around the 
availability of the entire market for integration firms,
llbid.
—  62 —
Equally as important is the fact that these firms should 
have the minimum capacity to satisfy the demand of all 
Central American countries. With this in mind, each of 
the protocols stipulates a minimum capacity for the inte­
gration plants. The determination of this capacity is to 
be based upon the total demand for a given product as 
determined by the historical volume of imports by Common 
Market countries. For example, the minimum annual capac­
ity of the caustic soda and chiorated insecticides indus­
try in Nicaragua is 4,700 metric tons of caustic soda and 
2,700 metric tons of chlorated camphene insecticides.^
The tire and tube industry of Guatemala is to have a 
yearly capacity of 225,000 tires and 180,000 t u b e s .% If 
the firms cannot satisfy the regional demand, the Execu­
tive Council— the main legislative body of the Common 
Market— can authorize enough imports to supply the needs 
of the area.
Initial capitalization. Since the contracting 
states prefer that integration firms do not become domi­
nated by foreign companies, restrictions are placed upon 
the ownership of the capital of integration firms. The 
caustic soda and chlorated insecticides industry, for 
example, was forced to offer at least 40 per cent of its
llbid.. Art. XIV, p. 29.
Zibid.. Art. XXII, p. 32.
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stock to Central American Investors.  ̂ In like manner, each 
of the protocols dictates the amount of capitalization and 
the minimum Central American participation.
Price controls. Price controls are perhaps the most 
crucial form of regulation written into the treaty. Logi­
cally, these controls must be implemented plant by plant and 
product by product. Periodic studies must be undertaken to 
determine the leVel of prices. In the case of tires and 
tubes. Article XXV states that the final selling price to 
the consumer shall in no case exceed the lowest list price 
in effect as of December 1, 1962.2 Of course, it is not 
enough to set up requirements. Studies must follow to check 
adherence to the regulations. This requires time and con­
siderable resources.
Also, should economies of scale be experienced by 
an integration firm, one cannot expect that it will kindly
respond by lowering its prices. Therefore, studies of costs
of production need to be undertaken to determine the feasi­
bility of price decreases. The treaty leaves this point 
open when it states that:
The Executive Council, through its Secretariat, 
shall be responsible for Insuring the correct applica­
tion of the foregoing provisions and for authorizing, 
as appropriate, such modifications in prices as con­
sidered advisable, due to fluctuations in production 
costs. 3
llbid.. Art. XIII, p. 28. Zibid.. Art. XXV, p. 32.
3lbid.. Art. XVII, p, 29.
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It is unclear whether or not this article is specifi- 
cally concerned with economies of scale. The fact that the 
word "fluctuation" is used suggests that costs, on a per 
unit basis, may either go up or down and that prices should 
be adjusted accordingly.
Quality controls. The products of integration 
plants are to fulfill quality norms to be formulated by the 
Research Institute (ICAITI) and approved by the Executive 
Council, If it is decided that the quality of the products 
of integration plants does not meet the standards of similar 
imported products, the Executive Council shall determine the 
measures which should be taken.^ The likely action of the 
Executive Council would be the authorization of imports at 
low tariff rates.
Distribution and supply of products. In order to 
prevent a monopoly over product distribution, the treaty 
states that the proprietors of integration plants shall not 
be permitted to act as retail distributors of the products 
specifically covered by the scheme. Integration plants are 
obligated to fill all orders formulated by distributors.^
For example, as a guarantee for an adequate and constant 
supply of tires and tubes, this plant is required to main­
tain on the market of the five member countries stocks 
which are the equivalent of two-months demand,
^Ibid.. Art. IV, p. 27.
^Ibid,. Art, VII, p. 27.
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Additional factors restricting monopoly power. A 
potentially limiting factor with respect to monopoly may 
result because the Executive Council can, by a majority 
vote, designate a second plant as an Integration industry 
provided that this plant offers 60 per cent of Its capital 
to Central American Investors.^ Of course, one additional 
plant does not, by any means, guarantee effective competi­
tion.
Another limitation on monopoly may evolve because 
the scheme does not preclude the establishment of a competi­
tive plant at the national level. Such a firm could not 
operate tariff free In the Common Market for a period of 
ten years, but It could gain national protection from out­
side competition and compete with the products of the inte­
gration plant on a national basis. In addition, this firm 
would not be subject to the various regulations concerning 
Integration Industries.
In most Instances, however, this would seem to be 
an unlikely occurrence. That Is, if the original regional 
monopoly expands its scale of operations and absorbs the 
market, an additional firm should not be able to economi­
cally exist. Moreover, if this should occur in a short 
period of time, it would be in direct opposition to a basic 
premise of the Integration Industries Scheme. That is, if
llbid.. Art, XXVII, p. 33.
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a firm can compete on a national scale with a plant of Inte­
gration, there Is really no need to have an Integration Indus­
try since, by definition, such firms need the entire regional 
market In order to Incur sufficient sales and, thereby, 
create reasonably efficient operating conditions.
In summary. It cannot be denied that the benefits to 
be received by Integration Industries are substantial. Yet, 
regulations and controls are also extensive In number and 
degree. These conceivably could lessen the number of appli­
cations. In this program an additional factor Is of impor­
tance. It Is the procedure which must be fdllowed by Indus­
tries seeking Integration status. Unfortunately, this 
designation process Is long, cumbersome, and filled with 
uncertainties.
Designation Procedures^
Initial application. To obtain Integration status, 
firms must first apply to the Permanent Secretariat (SIECA), 
either individually or in conjunction with their national 
governments. Typically, this preliminary report Is enacted 
through the national government because of the added pres­
tige and also because support by the national government 
may have some bearing upon the final result of the
^Thls Information was gained through an Interview by 
the author with Dr. Guillermo Noriega Morales, Head of the 
Industrial Department of the Permanent Secretariat and also 
by studying various unpublished proposals printed by the 
Permanent Secretariat.
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application. The preliminary report is often very detailed, 
spelling out the conditions of demand» probable costs 
involved, and the amount and source of the initial capitali­
zation of the firm. The Permanent Secretariat makes a pre­
liminary study of the application, making certain that the 
proposal is economically feasible and desirable.
Executive Council. If the Permanent Secretariat 
deems the project as acceptable, it is passed on to the 
Executive Council. This council, which meets approximately 
once each month, makes a preliminary decision concerning 
the desirability of the proposed project. However, since 
this council concerns itself with virtually all important 
matters of the Common Market, this decision may take two to 
three months, if not longer.
Research by ICAITI. When the Executive Council 
approves the application, it asks the Research Institute 
(ICAITI) to conduct a study of the project. ICAITI exam­
ines the economic feasibility of the project on a technical 
basis. It estimates the total import demand for the pro­
duct at the time of the application and also makes pro­
jections of future demand. Many studies for various 
products have already been accomplished by ICAITI. It is 
possible that any given study might have been carried out 
before ICAITI receives the request. However, in the event 
that research must begin from scratch, the study could 
take as long as one year. The applications for integration 
status sometimes contain their own estimates of internal 
demand.
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Drafting the protocol. A report is submitted by the 
Research Institute to the Permanent Secretariat (SIECA), 
SIECA, in turn, examines this report and prepares a state­
ment which typically recommends the project, stipulating 
any reservations which it might have. Both reports are 
then resubmitted to the Executive Council, The council 
discusses these statements in detail. If it can agree on 
the location of the plant, a protocol is drawn up.
Ratification of the protocol. When and if the 
Executive Council drafts the protocol, it generally recom­
mends that the document be signed by the Economic Council,
The Economic Council— the highest official Market organism 
composed of the Ministers of Economic Affairs of the member 
countries— usually signs the agreement without a great deal 
of consideration. Thus far at least, the Economic Council 
has not been a significant bottleneck in the legal apparatus.
Unfortunately, this is not the final step of the 
ratification procedure. Copies of the protocol must be sent 
to each of the member countries of the Common Market, It is 
here that regional politics begins to play a significant 
role. The protocol cannot go into effect until at least 
three of the contracting members have officially deposited 
their ratification at the Office of the Permanent Secretariat. 
As soon as three of the countries ratify the agreement, the 
firm can begin operations, but only in those countries which 
ratified the agreement.
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There is a dispute now in process concerning 
whether or not a declared integration industry can operate 
tariff free in the nonsigning countries. Although it has 
been legally decided that declared integration industries 
have the right of free trade in all countries,^ this action 
has not, as yet, been enforced and most likely will not be 
since there is no means to make such a decision compulsory.
Historical Survey of the Integration 
Industries Scheme
The Integration Industries Scheme was developed 
with the expectation that it would provide a driving force 
for medium- and large-scale industrialization in Central 
America. Its achievements to date do not confirm these 
expectations. The tangible results provided by the system, 
as measured from the years 1958 to I967, have been limited.
One could perhaps predict a major source of the 
bottlenecks involved in this program while reading the 
first portion of this chapter. The legal and institutional 
restrictions which were incorporated within the scheme are 
important influences on its implementation. An examination 
of the history of this mechanism bears out their importance.
 ̂ Honduras, Consejo Ejecutivo, Vigesimonovena 
Reunion, septiembre 17-23, 1%67, Secretaria Permanente de 
Tratado General de Integraciqn Economica Centroamericana. 
Memorandum de la Seccion Juridica sobre la Opinion sobre 
si las Llantas v Neumatioos Fabricados por Glnsa Tlenen 
Derecho al Libre Comerolo en Honduras (SIBCA/CE-XXIX/ 
D.T.21, September 2, I967) (Guatemala, I967), pp. 1-3.
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During the embryonic years of the integration move­
ment, a program of industrialization was uppermost in the 
plans of the member countries. In spite of this zeal, the 
final draft of the Integration Industries Treaty was some­
thing less than had been envisioned by the Economic Commis­
sion for Latin America. Rather than being an inclusive 
document which was applicable to all industries, it only 
consisted of a small number of basic “̂principles which were 
to guide Central American industrial integration.^
It became apparent that the original Integration 
Industries Treaty would have little or no real meaning in 
the Implementation of the program when it was agreed that 
each designation of an integration industry would require 
a signed protocol which had to be ratified by at least 
three of the member countries.
Although signed in Tegucigalpa on June 10, 1958, 
the original treaty was not ratified by Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua until June 4, I961.
Costa Rica did not ratify the agreement until September 23, 
1963.̂  Thus, the ratification of the original agreement 
took a period of three years, disregarding Costa Rica’s
^United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin 
America, Economic and Social Council, Report to the Central 
American Co-operation Committee. February 29, 1957-June 10. 
1958 TE/CN.12/CCE/151. 1959) (New York. 1959)" n. 10."
^Wardlaw, on. cit.. p. 6I. It should be recalled 
that Costa Rica did not become part of the Common Market 
until this same year; the ratification of the agreement by 
Costa Rica, therefore, was delayed until that time.
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late entry» A question arises as to whether or not this 
was a valid sample of the manner in which the subsequent 
protocols were to evolve. Unfortunately, the answer is 
"yes."
History of the First Protocol
In the meeting of the Economic Co-operation Commit­
tee of Central America in November, 19&1, each of the member 
countries demonstrated an interest in at least one project. 
The following products were considered by the corresponding 
countries:
1. Tires and Tubes —  Guatemala
2. Caustic Soda and Insecticides —  Nicaragua
3. Glass Containers —  Honduras
4. Electric Light Bulbs —  Honduras ,
5. Wire and Copper Tubing —  El Salvador
Since Costa Rica was not yet part of the Common 
Market, no project was presented. Honduras was forced to 
withdraw one of its proposed projects because of the agree­
ment on balanced allocation of integration industries» As 
a result, Honduras decided to submit the project on glass 
containers and withdrew its request for an electric light 
bulbs plant.
Tire and tube plant. One of the proposed plants of 
integration was already in operation on a national scale.
^Naciones Unidas, Comision Econémica Para America 
Latina, Comité de Cooperaciôn Econcimica del Istmo Centro- 
americano, Grupo dé Trabajo ad hoc Sobre Desarrollo Indus° 
trial. Informe del Relator (E/CN.12/CCE/G.T. IND/12, 
December 8, 1961) (New York, I96I), p. 11.
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This was the tire and tube plant of Guatemala which operates 
under the title of Gran Industria de Neumatioos Centroameri- 
canos (GINSA). None of the remaining plants were, as yet, 
constructed. This firm had been considering the idea of 
becoming an integration industry since it first began opera­
tions in 1957. Unlike the other proposed plants, GINSA had 
the experience of approximately five years of production 
within the Guatemalan market. As a result, this firm was 
able to present a detailed proposal which presented a con­
vincing case for becoming an industry of integration.
First of all, the capital distribution of the 
Guatemalan firm was very much in line with the requirements 
of the treaty. Only 5.8 per cent of the capital was foreign,^ 
In addition, GINSA had financed its own study of the demand 
for tires in Guatemala and Central America. Although the 
market of Guatemala was not large enough to allow reasonable 
efficiency in production, this firm maintained that the 
Central American market was adequate to support at least 
one plant. Since there were no other producers of tires 
and tubes in Central America, GINSA’s case for becoming an 
integration industry was solid.
^Naciones Unidas, Comision Economica Para America 
Latina, Comite de Cooperaci<Sn Econ6mica del Istmo Centro- 
americano, Grupo de Trabajo ad hoc Sobre Desarrollo Indus­
trial, Estudio Tecnologico-EconcSmico de la Industrie de 
Llantas en Centroamerioa (E/CN,12/CCB/G,T. IND/4, November 
23, 1961) (New York, I96I), p, 7.
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GINSA acted rapidly. The projections of demand for 
tires and tubes merited, in the opinion of GINSA, a second 
plant by the year I966, The firm proposed in December,
1962, that the second plant be located in Costa Rica and
that it be built and operated by GINSA.^ These quick actions
on the part of GINSA were accomplished in anticipation of 
possible competition and also because of the fact that a 
second plant in the same industry can be decreed by the 
Executive Coun&ll ĵ ithout the usual ratification procedure.^ 
GINSA was virtually assured of receiving integration status 
for its Guatemalan plant. If a second plant were to be 
constructed by the firm in 1966, this would in effect guar­
antee a monopoly throughout Central America.
Early in I963, however, the proposal of GINSA was
countered by an application by Costa Rica for the second 
plant of tires and tubes. The Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Company had consented to build a plant in Costa Rica. The 
proposal which GINSA had made to move into Costa Rica was 
apparently not appealing to the Costa Rioan government.
This was the formal beginning of the well-known dispute 
between GINSA and the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.
^Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Segunda Reunion, 
diciembre 10-15, I962, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado 
General de Integraciori Eeonomica Centro^ericana, Estudio 
de ^aluacion Teonica-Eoon6mica de la Fabrioa de Llantas 
■V Cdmaras para Automdvll (SIECA/CE-II/D.T.2. November 2Ô. 
1962) (Guatemala, 1962), p. 29.
pEconomic Integration Treaties of Central America.
A — w r r * r  *r ■m»— " " " " " "AX'U* AUkV JL.L, p #
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Even though Costa Rica had not, as yet, officially 
ratified the Integration Industries Agreement, the Minis­
ter of the Economy of Costa Rica, acting for Firestone, 
deposited an application for the second plant of tires and 
tubes in April, 19&3,^ With a detailed estimation of costs 
of production and projected sales, the proposal suggested a 
capacity of 100,000 tires. The most convincing aspect of 
the project was that a second plant of separate ownership 
would prevent a pure monopoly from existing in tire and 
tube production.2 Equally unattractive, however, was the 
fact that 75 per cent of the capital of the firm was to 
come from Firestone.^
The Permanent Secretariat (SIECA) prepared a reply 
to the Costa Rican government. Both the original proposal 
and the reply of SIECA were presented at the fourth reunion 
of the Executive Council in April, I963. The Secretariat 
expressed its opinion that the internal demand in Central 
America for tires and tubes was not, as yet, sufficient to 
merit the existence of a second plant, The report indicated
Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Cuarta Reunion, abril 
17-27, 1963, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de 
Integracion Economica Centroamericana, Solicitud del Gobiemo 
de Costa Rica nara una Segunda Planta de Llantas y Tubos 
(SIECA/CE-IV/16, March 31. 1963) (Guatemala, 19o3). Annex A,
pp. 1-4.
^Ibid., p, 3. 
3lbid., p. 1.
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that an additional plant with a capacity of 100,000 would 
be sustainable by 1969 or 1970.̂
The Secretariat based its decision on the data pre­
sented in Table 6. The data in this table indicate the 
estimated demand for tires in Central America (Column 1), 
the production of GINSA (Column 2), and the corresponding 
residual unfulfilled by GINSA (Column 3)« GINSA*s produc­
tion is based upon its capacity as required by the first 
2protocol. Column 3 indicates that the regional demand of 
Central America will be sufficient to support additional 
capacity of 100,000 tires by 1969. On the basis of this 
reasoning, the request for a second plant for the produc­
tion of tires and tubes was denied, at least temporarily.
Caustic soda and insecticides plants. In August, 
1962, Nicaragua presented to the Permanent Secretariat its 
formal proposal for caustic soda and insecticides plants.^
It should be noted that this application contained a request 
for two plants. Legally, the establishment of both of these 
plants in the same country would be in violation of the 
agreement on balanced allocation of industries. It was
^Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Cuarta Reunion, abril 
17-27, 1963, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de 
Integracion—Economloa Centroamericana, Apreeiaoion Sobre la 
Solicitud del Gobierno de Costa Rica Pa]% Estableoimiento 
de una ëemmda Planta de Llantas y Neumatioos ( SIECA/CE-IV/ 
16, April 6, 19037 (Guatemala, 19&3), P. 21.
2Economic Integration Treaties of Central America. Art. XXII, p. 32. — _
^Nardl&w, OP. Glto. p. 69.
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED DEMAND AND PRODUCTION OF TIRES IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA, ANNUALLY, 1965-1970 







(3)Margin of Demand 
Not Fulfilled 
by GINSA
1965 246 225 21
1966 268 225 43
1967 287 225 62
1968 311 225 86
1969 334 225 109
1970 364 225 139
*Based on 80 per cent of total demand. leaving 20 per cent
for imports,
SOURCES Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Cuarta Reunion, abri^ 
17=2%, 1963, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integracion 
Eeonomica Centroamericana, Anreoiacion Sobre la Solicitud del Gobiemo 
de Costa Rica Para Estableoimiento de una Segunda Planta de Llantas 
■V Neuméticos ( SIECA/CE-IV/16 . April [Guatemala,
O s
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decided, however, that the two plants were so closely inter= 
connected that they would he considered as one.
At the second meeting of the Executive Council in 
December, I962, the first protocol to the Integration Indus­
tries Agreement was prepared and signed. It included a 
declaration of integration status for the tire and tube 
plant of Guatemala and caustic soda and insecticides plants 
for Nicaragua.^
The movement of the first protocol through the 
first steps of the legal apparatus was reasonably rapid. 
Unfortunately, the protocol could not go into effect until 
it was signed by the Economic Council and ratified by at 
least three of the member countries. Although the Economic 
Council constituted no significant barrier in the progress 
of the protocol, the ratifications of the respective mem­
bers were instrumental in delaying the protocol for a rela­
tively long period of time. It was not until February 26,
1965. that any of the ratifications were deposited and then 
only by Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica. Nicaragua 
ratified the protocol in August, I965, and Honduras has yet 
to accept it.2
^Guatemala, ^eoretaria Permanente del Tratado 
General de Integracion Eeonomica Centroamericana, 
Resoluciones del Conse.lo Ejecutivo (Guatemala, June, I967), 
Act 2, Resolution 7, p. 13.
^Wardlaw, op. cit.. p. 69,
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As would be expected, the tire and tube plant 
immediately began operations in the countries which rati­
fied the protocol. Hence, GINSA has functioned under the 
privileges of the scheme for approximately two years. The 
caustic soda and insecticides plants were not constructed 
until integration status was virtually assured. According 
to the treaty, the two Nicaraguan plants were not required 
to begin production until twelve months after the protocol 
went into effect.^ Consequently, Nicaragua announced in 
December, I965, that the construction of the plants would 
proceed and that they would begin production in the latter 
part of 1967» The plants were to be listed under the 
titles of Eleotro-quimica Pensait (ELPELSA) and Hercules 
de Centroamerioa (HEHCASA),^ As of October, I967, the 
plants had just begun operations.
History of the Second Protocol
The third plant to be considered for integration 
status was a glass factory to be located in Honduras, 
Although Honduras indicated as early as I96I that it was 
interested in a glass factory, a formal application was
^Economic Integration Treaties of Central America. 
Art, II, p. 28, ^  '
^Chile, Consejo Economlco Interamerioano, junio 
15-26, 1967, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de 
Integracion Economica Centroamericana, Informe Sobre los 
Avances del Programs de Integracion Eoondmioa Centro- 
americana (febrero. 1966-mavo. 1967) (Guatemala. June. 
1967), p. 8,
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apparently not presented to the Executive Council until 
January, 1965.̂
Originally, in I96I, Honduras requested a factory 
to produce glass containers. However, the owners of the 
proposed glass containers factory, which originally sought 
integration status in Honduras, decided in I963 to con­
struct a plant in Guatemala City to serve the national 
market. Instead pf receiving the privileges of the Inte­
gration Industries Scheme, this firm is now operating under 
the auspices of the so-called Sistema Especial de Promocion 
de Actividades Productivas (Special System for Promoting 
Industrial Activities),^ Consequently, the second protocol 
designating an integration industry was altered to include 
a plate glass factory to be located in Honduras.
The movement of the second protocol through the 
preliminary steps of the legal framewprk was reasonably 
fast. As early as Juî y, 1965» the Executive Council 
approved the application.^ It was accepted by the Economic
^Honduras, Consejo Ejecutivo, Undecima Reunion, 
enero 12-18, 1965  ̂Secretaria Permanente del Tratado Gen­
eral de Integracion Economica Centroamericana, Proyecto 
de Fabrioaoion de Envases de Vldrio v Vidrio Plano (SIECA/ 
CE-Xl/53. Add. 1, December, 1964) (Guatemala, January 4,
1965), PP* 1-4.
^Informe Sobre los Avances del Programs de Inte­
gracion Egon<̂ mica Centroamericana. p. Ê (See Chapter VI).
R̂esoluciones del Consejo Ejecutivo. Act I6, 
Resolution 37, p. 73.
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Council in November of the same year.^ However, the second 
protocol has been able to advance only slightly beyond this 
stage. So far, only Nicaragua has ratified the Honduran 
glass factory. In all probability, the second protocol 
will eventually be ratified; yet, it is virtually certain 
that the ratification process will take at least as much 
time as it did in the case of the first protocol.
Status of the Second Plant of Tires and Tubes
Costa Rica did not give up in her quest for the 
second tire and tube plant. In February, 1965* a report 
which again explained the bases for a second tire and tube 
plant was reviewed by the; Economic Council,^ Because the 
Executive Council was unable to make a decision concerning 
the second plant, l̂ he application had to be referred to 
the Economic Council, The Economic Council ruled that the 
plant could have a maximum of 30 per cent foreign partici­
pation in the capit&l of the firm and not the 75 per cent 
suggested by Firestone,^ The Economic Council was also
^Guatemala, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado Gen­
eral de Integracion Eeonomica Centroamericana, Resoluciones 
del Conse.lo Economico (Guatemala, June, 196?), Act 16, 
Resolution 1Ô, p. 37.
^San Salvador, Consejo Economico, Cuarta Reunion 
Ordinaria, febrero 5-9, 1965», Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana, 
Bases Para la Incorooracion de una Segunda Planta de Llantas 
al Amnaro del Cohvenio Sobre el Régimen de Industrias Centro* 
americanas de Integraci<jn (Guatemala. September.
13, pp. 1-4. "
^Ibid.. p, 1,
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careful to point out that the product produced should carry 
Central American brand names and not the more familiar 
insignia 6f1;he foreign producer.^
The protocol for a second plant to produce tires 
and tubes has been prepared but has not, as yet, been 
approved by the Executive Council, The approval of the 
Executive Council is all that is required to accord inte­
gration status to Q second plant ; however, this council 
still has the matter under consideration. Perhaps one of 
the main reasons for the lack of acceptance has been the 
persistent complaints of the Guatemalan tire and tube plant 
that it has not been able to operate at full capacity,^
Firestone decided not to wait for a decision by the 
Executive Council, Instead, a plant has been constructed 
in Costa Rica to serve the national market and also, through 
an agreement, the market of Papama,^ These actions by Costa 
Rica directly oppose the theory supporting integration 
industries. Theoretically, the Guatemalan firm needs the 
entire market for efficient production and a reasonable 
return. The Permanent Secretariat suggested that a second
llbid,. p. 3.
^Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Trigesima Reunion, 
octubre 30-noviembre 5, 1967, Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana, 
Exposicion del Gobierno de Guatemala. Problemas que afectan 
a la Industria de Integraciôn— de llantas y neumatioos 
estableclda en dioha Repiiblica (3IECA/CE-XXX/D.T.2. October 
13, 196?) (Guatemala, 19&7), p. 3 (See Chapter V),
'Interview with Guillermo Noriega Morales, on, c-lt.
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plant would not be merited until I969, at which time the 
Firestone plant was virtually assured of receiving inte=* 
gration status. However, the Common Market has no author­
ity over the efforts of national governments to promote 
industry. Each of the member countries still maintains 
its own incentive devices to attract industrial activity.
According to conditions enumerated in the original 
treaty, the Firestone plant will receive a 10 per cent 
annual reduction in the tariffs on tires and tubes in each 
of the countries of Central America.^ In the event that 
the Costa Rican plant becomes an industry of integration 
(which is a reasonable possibility in the near future), 
the tariff will be removed.^
New Applications
During the years I966 and 19&7, seven new applica­
tions were made for integration industries. All five of 
the participating countries have deposited at least one 
proposal. Both the quantity of the applications and their 
competitive nature are unprecedented in the history of the 
program,
-I Economic Integration Treaties of Central America. 
Art. IV, po 22.
^The development of the tire and tube industry in 
Central America poses an interesting study of industrial 
growth in developing areas. This industry will be briefly 
discussed in Chapter VI,
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The first project to be presented was a pulp and 
paper mill to be located on the northern coast of Guate­
mala.^ There is little doubt that the resources of 
Guatemala merit the existence of a pulp and paper indus­
try. However, Guatemala is not the only country in 
Central America with abundant forests. Two other coun­
tries— Honduras^ and Nicaragua^— are also seeking the 
same industry.
Three applications for a pulp and paper industry 
will have to be considered simultaneously by the Executive 
Council. Logically, the location of the first plant will 
have to be determined on the basis of recommendations by 
the Research Institute and the Permanent Secretariat. 
However, the influence of politics will be difficult to 
avoid.
Nicaragua, Consejo Ejecutivo, Vlgesima Reunion, 
septiembre 16-19, 19̂ 6, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado 
General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana, Resumen 
del Proyecto de Puloa y Panel de Guatemala (SIECA/CE-XXII/ 
D.T.9-A, September 13, 1966) (Guatemala, 1966), pp. 1-7.
, ^Nicaragua, Consejo Ejecutivo, Vigesima Segunda 
Reunion, septiembre 16-19, 1̂ 66, Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana, 
Resumen del Proyecto de Puloa v Papel de Honduras (SIECA/ 
CE-XXII, D.T.9, September 9» 1966) (Guatemala, 1966), pp. 
1-10.
, Honduras, Consejo Ejecutivo, Vigesimonovena 
Reunion, septiembre 17-23» 1967,,Secretaria Permanente 
del Tratado General de Integracion Eeonomica Centroameri- 
oana, Resumen del Proyecto de Pulpa v Panel de Nicaragua 
(SIECA/CE-XXIX/D.T.29, September 7, 196?) (Guatemala,
1967), pp. 1-9.
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A similar problem is arising with respect to a 
nylon filaments industry* Guatemala^ and El Salvador^ pre­
sented applications for a nylon filaments plant in November,
1966. The development of a nylon filaments plant is logi­
cal since there are two tire and tube plants in Central 
America which would use this product as an input. Again, 
however, it is unlikely that two plants will be needed. 
Hence, the Executive Council will be forced to make a deci­
sion regarding the most practical location of the plant.
The two remaining applications are also competitive 
in nature. Both Honduras^ and Costa Rica^ have proposed a 
steel industry. It seem improbable that a steel industry 
can be comparatively efficient in Central America, but 
since developing countries take a great deal of pride in
^Nicaragua, Consejo Ejecutivo, Vigesima Segunda 
Reunion, noviembre 15'19, 1966, Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana, 
Solicitud de Guatemala Para Incornorar una Planta Pro- 
ductora de Pilamentos de Nildn al Rdgimen de Industrias 
de Integraciôn (SIECA/CE-XXII/D.T.4. June 15. 1966)
(Guatemala, 1966), pp= 1-6-
^Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Vigesima Cuarta 
Reunion, noviembre 15-19, 1966, Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integration Economica Centroamericana, 
Resumen del Proyecto de Nilon de El Salvador (SIECA/CE- 
XXIV/D.T.13, November 3, I966) (Guatemala, I966), pp. 1-5»
 ̂ ^Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Vigesima Cuarta 
Reunion, noviembre 15-19, i960, Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integration Eeonomica Centroamericana, 
Resumen de Proyecto Siderurglco de Honduras (SIECA/CE- 
XXII/D.T.ll, November 8, I906) (Guatemala, I966), pp. 1-9»
^Informe Sobre los Avances del Programa de Inte- 
graoion Econdmica Centroamericana. p. 9,
cm 8 5  “
having their own steel complex, one should not be surprised 
by these proposals. It is possible that the Research Insti­
tute and the Permanent Secretariat will conclude that con­
ditions are not, as yet, desirable for the development of 
a steel industry.
The number of applications presented in I966-67 is 
somewhat puzzling. In no other single period of time has 
there been such an interest in utilizing the Integration 
Industries Program. It is likely that the renewed interest 
in the scheme originated because of a reinterpretation by 
the Economic Council of the so-called balanced growth 
article in the Integration Industries Treaty, It should 
be recalled that this article prevented countries from 
receiving additional integration industries until all 
countries acquired at least one.
The original clause found in the Integration Indus­
tries Treaty reads as follows:
The contracting states shall not designate a second 
plant in the same country until each of the five 
Central American countries has been assigned a plant 
in accordance with the protocols contemplated in 
Article III.l
Although this statement is not ambiguous, the Economic 
Council has chosen to reinterpret this clause to allow the 
designation of more than one industry at any given time.
That is, the Economic Council in April, 1964, reinterpreted
^Economic Integration Treaties of Central America.
p. 25.
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this clause to mean that a second Integration plant cannot 
be assigned within the "same Industry" to any country until 
a plant In the "same Industry" has been assigned to each 
of the remaining countries.^
This new_lnterpretat1on has apparently left the 
door open for the designation of more than one Industry to 
a country without consideration of the requirement that 
each of the other countries possess an equal amount of 
Integration Industries. Por example, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua, which possess Integration plants, no longer 
need to wait until the other members have received an Inte­
gration Industry before applying for additional plants. 
Contrariwise, Nicaragua and Guatemala will not be able 
to establish a second plant In their respective integra­
tion Industries on their own soil until each of the con­
tracting states also has one Integration plant In that 
same Industry, Even though It Is still somewhat restric­
tive, the new interpretation by the Economic Council has 
apparently released one of the most binding provisions of 
the Integration Industries Scheme and, hence, has been 
influential In bringing about the recent wave of applica­
tions. This new Interpretation has not, as yet, been 
challenged by the member countries.
^Wardlaw, op. clt., p. 92.
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Summary
The theory supporting the Integration Industries 
Scheme is an extension of one of the most well-known 
principles of economic integration; that is, the bene­
fits which can accrue due to the increased size of a 
market. Regional demand will theoretically support many 
industries that could not exist on a national level.
Through the offer of an enlarged market and other attrac­
tive incentives, the Integration Industries Scheme attempts 
to promote the development of medium- and large-scale 
industries in Central America.
The original treaty and the subsequent protocols 
demonstrate that the problem of monopoly was recognized. 
Integration firms are monopolies, but like many monopolies 
in the United States, they are regulated. Admittedly, the 
provision of regulations does not guarantee that they will 
be enforced. It is not an easy task to carry out regula­
tions regarding such things as quality and pricing.
The legal steps which must be followed to become 
an Integration industry are many and involve a consider­
able amount of time. It is possible that a proposal could 
be held up in the Executive Council, for example, for an 
indefinite period of time. If and when it does pass, it 
could be filled with suggested changes which prove unaccept­
able to the firm. If one also assumes that the firm will 
not begin construction of the plant until it has been rati­
fied, the time factor is expanded even more.
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In terms of "being a stimulus to industrial develop­
ment, the Integration Industries Scheme has thus far been 
rather unsuccessful* Although the treaty was signed in 
1958, it was not fully ratified until I963. The first 
protocol which designated a tire and tube plant for 
Guatemala and caustic soda and insecticides plants for 
Nicaragua was signed in January, I963, but was not rati­
fied until February, I965. The second protocol which 
designated a plate glass factory for Honduras was signed 
in November, I965, but since then has only been ratified 
by one country. Honduras has not ratified either of the 
protocols. Companies seeking integration status must 
possess a great deal of patience and perseverance. If in 
line with past experience and if successful, an applying 
firm may become an integration industry in three to five 
years.
A new interpretation of the restrictive Temporary 
Article of the treaty by the Economic Council has been a 
factor in spurring a number of new proposals for integra­
tion industries. Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua have 
recently indicated a desire for a pulp and paper industry; 
Guatemala and El Salvador, a nylon filaments industry; 
and Costa Rica and Honduras, a steel industry. Since many 
countries are applying for the same industries, decisions 
will have to be made concerning the optimum allocation of 
the plants. Given the lack of success of the program up
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to this point, it is conceivable that the future of the 
Integration Industries Scheme may depend upon the dexterity 
and finesse with which the new proposals are handled.
CHAPTER V
AN ANALYSIS OP THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
INTEGRATION INDUSTRIES SCHEME
Introduction 
A planned program of industrial development 
typically is characterized by numerous perplexing problems. 
These problems become more complex when such a program is 
pursued within the framework of economic integration. The 
Integration Industries Scheme is characterized by problems 
inherent in economic planning as well as economic integra­
tion.
The major problems of this program center basically 
around two separate categories. The first of these is con­
cerned with the mechanisms, policies, and attitudes which 
determine the character and the significance of the Inte­
gration Industries Scheme. The long and cumbersome pro­
cedure which must be followed by firms seeking integration 
status is the most apparent problem in the first category. 
After industries have been designated, a second major 
problem area evolves. This is the apparatus of control 
over the integration industries. Since these firms are 
legal monopolies, the aspects of control become crucial,
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The types and amounts of regulation require a great deal 
of flexibility and adaptation on the part of regulatory 
authorities. Decisions must be made on the basis of 
efficiency and welfare criteria; yet, they cannot be too 
lax nor can they be too stringent.
This chapter contains a description and analysis 
of the major problems of the scheme. Particular refer­
ence is made to GINSA, the tire and tube plant, since 
this provides the only opportunity for a case study of 
an integration industry in operation. Particular emphasis 
is placed upon those factors which explain why the program 
has met with rather limited success. In this connection, 
the Honduran problem and also the negative attitude of 




The development of a program of economic integration 
is usually a slow process. Even though integration may be 
in its earliest infancy, the concept which permeates its 
entire realm is industrialization, especially in the devel­
oping areas. In fact, if integration were not considered 
to be a convenient means to industrialization, it is likely 
that some schemes would not be conceived. Industrial pro­
grams are often hastily developed and are expected to bring
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immediate results. However, the foresight and the plan­
ning necessary for industrial growth are not recognized 
until a system has failed to work.
The Integration Industries Agreement did not pro­
vide a good framework for a far reaching program of indus­
trialization. The Economic Commission for Latin America 
had definite ideas about the desirable characteristics of 
such an agreement. However, la polltica industrial^ would 
not permit the needed flexibility. Each country acted as 
if it believed the development of one country would be at 
the expense of others. Consequently, the Integration 
Industries Agreement was filled with legal and institu­
tional bottlenecks.
Each of the members wanted to have a voice in the 
declaration of integration industries in order to protect 
its national interests. Even though this was to be a 
regional program, development was viewed principally on- 
a national level. Both the Executive Council and the 
Economic Council contain members from each of the respec­
tive countries. Yet, this was not sufficient protection 
of national sovereignty. It was also agreed that each 
protocol had to be ratified by the legislatures of at 
least three members before it could go into effect. 
Furthermore, as a last protective device, an article was
^The English language does not typically use this 
specific term. Generally, it refers to politics as it
relates to the industrial sector.
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included which prevented any one country from receiving 
two integration industries until each had been designated 
at least one. Thus, the Integration Industries Agreement 
reflected the fact that a regional atmosphere of indus­
trial development was not present in 1958.
Important Factors Acting to Restrain 
the Designation Procedure
Perhaps no single clause has affected the time and 
the uncertainty of the designation procedure more than the 
ratification requirement. &ich of the protocols adopted 
has been delayed for approximately two years pending rati­
fication. BCLA has recommended that this clause be removed 
from the treaty and that the Economic Council become the 
ultimate authority.^ The Permanent Secretariat and the 
Research Institute also recognize the limitations posed 
by this clause. There has been discussion about the 
possibility of taking action to make this change; however,
pthis matter has not, as yet, been formally considered.
The temporary article concerned with balanced 
growth has also been instrumental in delaying implementa­
tion. During the period from 1958-196A, this article was 
interpreted to mean that no country could receive a second
%aciones Unidas, Comisidn Econdmica Para America 
Latina, Evaltiacidn de la Integracidn Econdmica en Centro- 
america (E/CN.12/CCE/327/Rev. 2, January, 1966) (New York,
1966), p. I6l.
^Interview with Guillermo Noreiga Morales, on. cit.
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integration industry until each was designated one. Con­
sequently, each country was permitted only one application 
at a time, and this application had to be accepted before 
additional firms could be considered. There is little 
doubt that this clause was important in accounting for the 
apparent lack of interest in the scheme from 1962-1965.
Since all countries had not received one designation, it 
was pointless for any country to apply for a second firm.
As was indicated in Chapter IV, in 1964 the Economic 
Council reinterpreted the balanced growth clause to mean 
that a second integration plant "in the same industry" 
cannot be allocated to a given country until all countries 
receive at least one plant "in that same industry," Under 
this interpretation, a country apparently may receive any 
number of designations in different industries without 
restriction. This seemingly adds flexibility to the 
mechanism. However, as long as each country plays an 
important role in determining the existence of integration 
plants through ratification, the new interpretation may 
not be extremely meaningful. Moreover, this view of 
balanced growth distorts the concept of comparative advan­
tage in the integration area. For example, if Guatemala 
can produce tires and tubes relatively efficiently, then 
it seems ridiculous to allow all countries to have their 
own tire and tube operation before Guatemala can build 
additional plants.
-  95 -
The case of Honduras. Honduras is the least 
developed nation of Central America. It entered the Common 
Market with less manufacturing than the other member coun­
tries. Before the Common Market became a reality, most of 
the countries were following policies on a national level 
to promote industrial growth. The most popular policy was 
import substitution. The countries following this policy 
maintained external tariff barriers to protect internal 
infant industries.
At the time of acceptance of the General Treaty 
for Economic Integration, Honduras had not begun a purpose­
ful program of import substitution. Therefore, the tariff 
structure was not as high in Honduras as it was in the 
remaining countries. When Honduras subscribed to the 
common external tariff, trade was diverted from outside 
sources to internal countries. Consequently, Honduras has 
been obliged to pay higher prices for many Central American 
goods that she originally imported from outside sources.
In addition, Honduras has complained that this sacrifice 
has not resulted in any increase in the sales of Honduran 
products to other areas of the Common Market.^
This particular example reveals the problem of 
reciprocity and balanced development in Central America, 
Honduras has developed a rather negative attitude toward
Wardlaw, on. cit., p. 85.
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the integration movement "because this country has not 
experienced the growth patterns which have characterized 
the other economies during the first years of integration,^ 
One of the actions taken by Honduras to impress upon the 
remaining countries its dissatisfaction with present con­
ditions has been a refusal to ratify the existing protocols 
of the Integration Industries Program. Thus, the actions 
of one sovereign nation serve to restrain the entire 
regional effort.
The members of an integration area should not 
expect to experience equal growth rates. With this factor 
in mind, it does not seem rational, especially in the short 
run, to allow one country to stymie the entire integration 
movement. Yet, when documents such as the Integration 
Industries Agreement contain protective clauses, each of 
which reflects a deep-seated concern over national sover­
eignity, it becomes rather easy for one country to 
influence the success of the integration movement. By 
refusing to ratify the protocols designating integration 
industries, Honduras partially accounts for the relative 
lack of success which has characterized the Integration 
Industries Scheme.
U.S. Attitudes
The United States has taken a very favorable atti­
tude toward the general movement of integration in Central
^See Table 4, Chapter III.
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America. This was witnessed in 196I when President Kennedy 
stated:
We must support all economic integration which is a 
genuine step toward larger markets and greater com­
petitive opportunity. The fragmentation of Latin 
America's economies is a serious barrier to indus­
trial growth. Projects such as the Central American 
Common Market and free trade areas in South America 
can help to remove these obstacles.1
The position of the United States regarding integra­
tion industries, however, is the direct opposite.
The United States opposes integration industries and 
considers that they will tend to limit competition 
and ultimately benefit neither the economy of the 
region or the consumer. It is hoped that the Regime 
of Central American Integration Industries is not to 
become a lasting feature of the regional economic 
integration program.2
The United States may be taking a genuine, but 
naive, view toward monopoly or it could be seeking to pro­
tect its investors. The important consideration, however, 
is that its attitude is negative, and this conceivably 
has affected the success of the scheme. The U.S. extended 
approximately 10 million dollars in loans to the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), none of 
which can be used to finance integration industries.^
^"Address of the President of the U.S. to Latin 
American Diplomats and Members of U.S. Congress," Depart­
ment of State Bulletin. XLIV (April 3» 19&1), p. ^73»
^Letter from Robert E. Simpson, Director, Office 
of International Regional Economics, Department of Commerce, 
in James Cochrane, "U.S. Attitudes Toward Central American 
Economic Integration," Inter-American Economic Affairs.
XVIII (Autumn, 1964), p. 'Ô3.
^Interview with Licenciado Antonio Palacios, Co­
ordinator, Banco de Guatemala, November 4, I967.
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Suoh a measure would seem to influence the success of the 
program considerably since there is a serious capital 
shortage in Central America. Yet, it appears that this 
has not been the case because most potential investors, 
at least so far, have been sufficiently liquid to avoid 
borrowing from the Bank of Integration. According to one 
representative from the bank, CABEI has performed a negli­
gible role in the Integration Industries Program simply 
because it has not, as yet, been called upon for financial 
support.̂
The only other pressure which the U.S. may have 
exerted on the scheme would be in the form of policy state­
ments, Exactly what significance these statements have had 
in discouraging firms from using the program is difficult 
to determine. A representative of the U.S. AID Mission 
to Central America and Panama (ROCAP) indicated that the 
attitude of the United States has not hindered the program.^ 
At any rate, it is evident that there are various bottle­
necks which have hindered the scheme more than U.S. policy 
statements.
Interview with Licenciado Collart, Representative 
of the Industrial Promotion Division of CABEI, Guatemala 
City, Guatemala, November 4, I967.
^Interview with Mr. William Sowash, Assistant 
Director, Development Planning, ROCAP, Agency for Inter­
national Development, Guatemala City, Guatemala, October 27,
1967.
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The Regulatory Mechanism 
The Integration Industries Scheme is characterized 
by a problem of monopoly control. Integration industries 
are legal monopolies and, consequently, the restrictive 
aspects of monopoly power must be alleviated through regu­
latory devices. Thus far, the Permanent Secretariat and 
the Executive Council have been presented with the task 
of regulating integration industries.
Even though there is only one firm which has oper­
ated under the scheme for a significant period of time, 
the Permanent Secretariat has been beset with numerous 
problems. Because it is the first integration industry, 
the tire and tube plant has been, to some extent, an 
experimental device. It has been subject to various regu­
lations and restrictions, some of which were unexpected.
For example, the integration firm had not anticipated that 
her products would not be accorded the market of Honduras. 
Legally, Honduras is obligated to remove tariffs; as yet, 
this country has refused to accept the protocol.
Distribution Policy 
One of the important regulations established by 
the first protocol is concerned with control over the dis­
tribution of tires and tubes. The Executive Council has 
established a fixed rate of discount (from the final selling 
prices) at which GINSA can sell its tires to distributors. 
Sines the final selling prices are established by decree.
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many distributors are unhappy about a low rate of profit. 
Distributors prefer to handle foreign tires because of a 
higher rate of return.^
GINSA is also required to maintain stocks in each 
country equal to two-months supply and, therefore, must 
maintain warehouses at extra cost. The firm argues that 
this is both unnecessary and inefficient. The whole prob­
lem of distribution could be completely solved, according 
to GINSA, if the firm were able to dictate its own sales
policy.2
The control over distribution policy was written 
into the first protocol and is unlikely to be dropped com­
pletely. However, to the extent that distributors are 
getting a low return from GINSA*s products, the integra­
tion firm has a legitimate complaint.
Tariff Policy
Probably the main problem which concerns GINSA is 
that the firm has not been able to fully utilise its 
installed capacity. GINSA was required by the first pro­
tocol to increase its capacity to 225,000 tires. Rather 
than merely fulfill this requirement, the firm proceeded 
to increase its capacity to 300,000 tires. During the
^Exnosicidn del Gobierno de Guatemala. Problemas 
que afeotan a la Industrie de Integraciijn— de llantas y 
neumdticos establecida en dicha Renübllca. pp. 1-3.
^Ibid., p. 3,
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year 1966, GINSA sold 171,601 tires— a substantial increase 
over recent years tout which was, according to the firm, only 
57.2 per cent of its installed capacity.^
In spite of its early success, GINSA is anxious to 
operate closer to the actual capacity of the firm. The total 
imports of tires and tutoes of Central America from outside 
countries were still high in 1966, amounting to #6,228,820.  ̂
In the same year, the imports of other member countries from 
Guatemala reached $4,781,106.3 During 1964-1966, sales in 
Common Market countries toy the integration firm increased 
substantially.^ Yet, imports from outside countries con­
tinued to toe high (in an absolute sense) in 1966, This was 
true in spite of the common external tariff established toy 
the treaty. Foreign firms were able to capture a substan­
tial portion of the market even though the prices of their 
tires and tutoes were noticeably higher.^
^Exoosicicfn del Gobierno de Guatemala. Problemas 
oue afectan a la Indu stria de Integraciĉ n— de liant as y 
v»̂ «-4ticcs sstatolecida. sn diohia Hsodbllca. i). 3»
2gee Table 11, Appendix A. Figures on the exact 
number of tires and tubes imported from outside countries 
were not available. A rough estimate would be 140,000 
tires and 135.000 tubes.
3see Table 10, Appendix A. Figures on the exact 
number of tires and tubes imported from Guatemala were not 
available, A rough estimate would be 100,000 tires and 
90,000 tubes.
^See Table 10, Appendix A.
^A survey of tire prices in Guatemala City by the 
author showed that foreign tires sold for approximately three 
to five dollars more than those of GINSA for o cm parable sizes.
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This is not an unusual problem for firms in develop­
ing areas. Foreign brand names are strong in the minds of 
the consumer. Many are willing to pay a higher price for 
foreign tires because they believe that these tires are of 
a higher quality. In many circumstances, foreign products 
are superior to products produced within the Common Market. 
Apparently, however, tires produced by GINSA are equal in 
quality to the foreign brands.^
The integration firm is impatient with the reluc­
tance of consumers to increase their response to its lower 
prices. Part of this impatience is inspired by the exist­
ence of an additional firm in Costa Rica. GINSA is likely 
to lose a good share of the Costa Rican market. To compen­
sate for this loss, the integration firm would like to 
increase sales in other Common Market countries. The sug­
gested method is to further insulate the Central American 
market from the outside through higher tariffs.
GINSA argues that the present system is inadequate 
for proper protection. In one particular circumstance, it 
appears that GINSA's complaint is justified. Because of 
the amazing competitiveness of Japanese products, the 
existing duties of 90 cents specific (75 cents for large
^The quality of GINSA*s tires has been verified 
by tests through the Research Institute (ICAITI), Also, 
questions asked by the author to a small sample of con­
sumers and retailers in Guatemala City revealed no dis­
content with the quality of GINSA's tires.
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tires) and 10 per cent ad valorem are insufficient to 
raise Japanese tires to price levels comparable to other 
brands.
The data in Table 7 help to explain this phenomenon. 
For the three different sizes of tires considered in this 
table, the final Japanese price is lower than either GINSA*s 
or those from the United States, Observe also that the 
prices of U.S. tires are noticeably higher than those of 
either GINSA or Japan (Column 4).
GINSA proposes to correct this situation by imposing 
a duty rate of two dollars^BHBHH^^O per cent ad 
valorem.^ In accordance^H|HHHH^^Hkf import substi­
tution, the integration sufficient
protection from the inexj^^^^^^BHHSjfroducts. However, 
it appears that GINSA is this circumstance
to take advantage of an opportunity for complete isolation 
of the common market for tires. Even though the prices of 
tires are lower in the case of Japan, the imports of tires 
and tubes from that country in I966 only amounted to 
$1,303,200 or 27 per cent of total imports. The imports 
from the United States, in spite of the apparent higher 
prices of U.S. products, amounted to $3,319,900 or 9̂ per 
cent of total imports.^
^Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Trigesima Reunion, 
octubre 30-noviembre 5, 1967», Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integraclon Economica Centroamericana, 
Comentarios de la Secretaria a la Ex p o sic i<̂ n del Gobierno 
de Guatemala (SI^A/GS-XXX/D.T.2é. October 16. 196?) 
(Guatemala, 196?)♦ p. 11.
^Ibid.. p. 6.
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tires) and 10 per cent ad valorem are insufficient to 
raise Japanese tires to price levels comparable to other 
brands.
The data in Table 7 help to explain this phenomenon. 
For the three different sizes of tires considered in this 
table, the final Japanese price is lower than either GINSA*s 
or those from the United States, Observe also that the 
prices of U.S, tires are noticeably higher than those of 
either GINSA or Japan (Column 4).
GINSA proposes to correct this situation by imposing 
a duty rate of two dollars specific and 20 per cent ad 
valorem.^ In accordance with the theory of import substi­
tution, the integration firm is entitled to sufficient 
protection from the inexpensive Japanese products. However, 
it appears that GINSA is attempting to use this circumstance 
to take advantage of an opportunity for complete isolation 
of the common market for tires. Even though the prices of , 
tires are lower in the of Jspan, ühe imports of tires
and tubes from that country in I966 only amounted to 
#1,303,200 or 27 per cent of total imports. The imports 
from the United States, in spite of the apparent higher 
prices of U.S, products, amounted to #3,319,900 or 49 per 
cent of total imports.^
^Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Trigesima Reunion, 
octubre 30-noviembre 5, 19&7^ Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integracion Econcmica Centroamericana, 
Comentarios de la Secretaria a la Exposieiĉ n del Gobierno 
de_^Ugt^mal& %2I2CA/C2—XXX/U,T,2w, October Iw, 19̂ 7, 
(Guatemala, I967), p. 11.
^Ibid.. p, 6.
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SOURCE*. Adapted from Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Trigesima Reunion, 
ootubre 30-noviembre 5» 19&7, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Inte- 
gracidn Econdmica Centroamericana, Comentarios de la Secretaria a la Exposicidn 
del Gobierno de Guatemala (SIECA/CE-XXX/D.T.2d, October l6, 196?) (Guatemala, 19&7), 
p. 10.
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The effect of the proposed tariff change on the same 
three tires is indicated in Table 8. As the figures in 
Column 4 demonstrate, not only would the prices of Japanese 
tires be substantially increased, but also the prices of 
U.S. tires would be raised completely out of proportion to 
those of the integration firm. Consequently, consumers 
would virtually be forced to purchase tires from the inte­
gration firm, and GINSA would benefit because of increased 
sales and profits.^
Since the integration firm is an infant industry 
in the Common Market, it seems reasonable that the tariff 
on Japanese tires should be raised to equalize the prices 
of tires sold by GINSA and Japan,^ However, the proposed 
general increase in the tariff on all imported tires should 
not be needed to expand the sales of the integration firm. 
Consumers in Central America are responding to the quality 
and the prices of GINSA*s products. Excluding the imports 
of Guatemala and Honduras from outside countries, GINSA 
was able to attract nearly one-half of the import market 
in two years (1964-1966),  ̂ If GINSA launches an extensive
^It is important to note that the increase in the 
tariff would most likely decrease tariff revenue because 
of reduced imports,
^The Permanent Secretariat has expressed its opin­
ion in favor of this measure. Comentarios de la Secretaria 
a la Exposioion del Gobierno de Guatemala, p, 12,
^See Table 12, Appendix A,
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SOURCE: Adapted from Guatemala, Consejo Ejeoutlvo, Trigesima Reunion,
octubre 30-noviembre 5» 19&7, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integra­
clon Econdmica Centroamericana, Comentarios de la Secretaria a la Exposicidn del 
Gobierno de Guatemala (SIECA/CE-X5a/D.T.2é ,̂ October 16, 1967) (Guatemala. 19&7), 
p. 10.
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advertising campaign, the firm should be able to further 
increase Its sales In the Common Market without Increasing 
tariffs. However, since a new plant has been constructed 
In Costa Rica, GINSA should perhaps be cautious about addi­
tional plant expansion, at least In the near future.
The very nature of the Integration Industries 
Program dictates problems of control, such as those des­
cribed above. The Integration firm desires to receive all 
of the benefits of the system but does not want to be 
bothered with the aspects of control. The Permanent 
Secretariat, as well as other Common Market authorities, 
realize the economic significance of monopoly. Hence, 
there Is a conscientious attempt to Install what are 
believed to be necessary regulatory devices. The firm thus 
becomes Involved In a maze of bureaucratic controls, some 
of which may be unnecessary. A certain amount of regula­
tion Is needed; yet, regulations should not be so stringent 
as to discourage entrepreneurs from utilizing the Integra­
tion Industries System.
The problems associated with the controlling 
mechanism have not emerged In force because of the relative 
Infancy of the program. If the bottlenecks which have thus 
far restricted the Implementation of the agreement are 
relaxed. It seems probable that monopoly regulation will 
become an Increasingly Important problem area. This does 
not mean that a more effective system of regulations
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cannot be developed.^ It is certain, however, that the 
Permanent Secretariat and the Executive Council, with 
their diverse interests in the Common Market, are in no 
position terhandle regulatory matters.
New Plant in Costa Rica 
The development of firms on a national basis which 
are competitive with integration industries demonstrates a 
lack of knowledge or respect for the theory supporting this 
industrial scheme. New firms are not supposed to be con­
structed until the market can support them. If firms of 
individual countries intend to compete with integration 
industries, the system may as well not exist. Given the 
size of the Central American area, it is difficult enough 
to utilize the capacity of a single firm. The sporadic 
addition of new firms tends to compound the problem of 
excess capacity and may lead to increased protected 
inefficiency,
lii the case of the tire and tube industry, the new 
plant is perhaps one or two years premature since the _ 
estimated demand for regionally produced tires in 1970 is 
approximately 400,000 tires.^ This should be sufficient
^See Chapter VI for suggestions to improve the 
regulatory process,
^Exposioion del Gobierno de Guatemala. Problemas 
que afectan a la Indu stria de Inbegraciĉ n— de llantas y 
neumàtioos establecida en dicha Repdblica7 P. 7.
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to support the 300,000 capacity of GINSA and the 100,000 
capacity of the new firm.
The development of the tire and tube industry in 
Central America over the next decade will present an inter­
esting case study of industrial growth in a developing area. 
The most probable occurrence would seem to be a splitting 
of the market between the two firms. The Firestone plant 
is likely to fulfill virtually the entire market of Costa 
Rica and the majority of Nicaragua's. GINSA will concen­
trate mainly on Guatemala and also the comparatively strong 
market of El Salvador. Assuming that Honduras eventually 
signs the first protocol, sales will probably be split in 
that country with its primary emphasis still on the import 
sector. Both companies should make good inroads into the 
import market, and any expansion in internal demand for 
tires will probably be fulfilled by the Central American 
firms.
w t x m m c t J L  .y
There are numerous problems which characterize the 
Integration Industries Scheme. Many of these concern the 
excessive preoccupation of the member countries with 
national interests. Each of the members has shown a desire 
to industrialize; yet, they have been unwilling to permit 
the existence of an atmosphere conducive to a successful 
regional development program.
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Because of this factor, the Integration Industries 
Scheme has been enveloped with restraining clauses which 
permit the actions of one country to significantly affect 
the entire regional effort. The ratification requirement 
and the balanced growth clause are good examples of this 
phenomenon. Each of these factors has been important in 
accounting for the lack of success which has characterized 
the scheme. For example, Honduras, which has incurred 
numerous problems during the first years of integration, 
has chosen not to ratify any of the existing protocols 
designating integration industries.
The concept which permeates the Integration Indus­
tries Treaty is that of balanced growth and reciprocity.
If one or more of the countries is adversely affected by 
integration in the short run, sufficient conditions are 
established which permit a country or countries to curtail 
the regional development movement.
It is the belief of some authors that the negative 
attitude of the United States toward the scheme has helped 
to prevent successful implementation. Although U.S. policy 
statements may have been an intangible factor in discourag­
ing possible entrepreneurial activity, these effects have 
probably been negligible when compared with the institu­
tional restraints in the system.
The problem of regulation in the Integration Indus­
tries Program is in its embryonic stage. However, it is
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not too early to perceive that these aspects of the scheme 
will require a great deal of adaptability on the part of 
regulatory officials. If too much control is exerted, this 
will act as a disincentive for the utilization of the agree­
ment. Likewise, integration industries cannot be permitted 
to abuse their legal monopoly power. As more integration 
industries are designated, this problem will become more 
evident.
The addition of firms on a national level which are 
competitive with integration industries undermines the basis 
of the Integration Industries Scheme. Movements in this 
direction may result in excess capacity and enhanced pro­
tected inefficiency. In a small market area, it is impera­
tive that national policies be coordinated with regional 
development plans.
CHAPTER VI
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR REGIONAL INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Introduction
Because the Integration Industries Scheme has been 
of limited effectiveness In developing the Industrial base 
of Central America and also because this system Is concerned 
primarily with medium to heavy Industries, other programs 
have been conceived which attempt to speed up the overall 
Industrialization process. In addition to Integration Indus­
tries, there are four mechanisms concerned with Industrial 
growth. These consist of a program of fiscal Incentives, a 
special system for the promotion of production, the so-called 
assembling Industries, and a project for the development of 
textiles.
This chapter briefly examines each of these agree­
ments In terms of their objectives and their accomplishments. 
An attempt Is made to determine the role of these mechanisms 
in Initiating Industrial development. It Is Important to 
note whether or not these programs are Intended or able to 
replace the Integration Industries Scheme.
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It is also the goal of this chapter to suggest some 
possible improvements which could be incorporated within 
the Integration Industries Scheme. Recommendations are 
made to ease the restrictions of implementation and to smooth 
the wheels of operation, both with the goal of making this 
program an effective tool for future use.
Convention on Fiscal Incentives 
With the exception of the Integration Industries 
Program, the Convention on Fiscal Incentives is the oldest 
industrial agreement existing in the Common Market, This 
treaty was signed on July 31, 1962, and consists of an 
attempt to fix the limits on tariff and tax concessions 
which Central American countries can offer to encourage 
industrial investments.^
Currently, each of the member countries has its 
own incentive devices— some being strong and others rather 
weak. A regional system of fiscal incentives would 
restrict the competition among the countries in attracting 
new manufacturing by equalizing incentive measures. For 
example, the possible benefits available under the con­
vention would be total exemption from import levies on 
machinery and equipment for a period of ten years, total 
exemption on levies for raw materials and semi-manufactures
^Cinoo Anos de Lahores en la Integracion Eoonomica 
Centroamericana (Guat^ala; Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integracion Econdmica Centroamericana, 
October 12, lyoo), p. 55»
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for five years, total exemption from income taxes for eight 
years, and exemption from property and asset taxes for ten 
years.l
The privileges to be gained by each firm operating 
under the agreement are quite substantial. Unfortunately, 
however, this program has not as yet been implemented. By 
February, 1965i the fourth ratification of the agreement 
was deposited by Nicaragua, but Honduras has not yet 
accepted the agreement. Honduras argues that she should 
be granted special concessions because of her relatively 
underdeveloped condition. This program provides no such 
concessions, Honduras indicated that this agreement would
compound the unfavorable effects which have characterized
2her country during the first years of the Common Market. 
Honduras has proposed a new program of incentives which 
grants special concessions to her own industry. Thus far, 
only Nicaragua has ratified this special agreement.^
Consequently, there does not exist a generalized 
program of fiscal incentives in Central America, Unless
^Guatemala, Agency for International Development, 
Regional Office for Central America and Panama (ROCAP), 
Central American Agreement on the Equalization of Fiscal 
Incentives for Industrial Development (April. 1964). 
(Guatemala, 1964), Art, VIII, p. 5«
^Wardlaw, op. clt,. p, 90,
^Nicaragua, Consejo Economlco, Decimotercera Reunion 
Extraordinaria, septiembre 19-23,, i960, Seoretarla Permanente 
del Tratado General de Integraclon Economica Centroamericana, 
Protocole al Convenio de Incentives Fiscales al Desarrollo 
Industrial iAugust, lyoo; iGuatemala, lyooj, pp. 1-20,
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the member countries are willing to grant special concessions 
to Honduras, it appears that each of the countries will con­
tinue to use national devices, at least in the reasonably 
near future.
Special System for the Promotion of Production
A second program has been in effect since January, 
1963, It is called the Special System for the Promotion of 
Production. Under this system, the Economic Council may 
designate industries for what is called Special Systems 
Status, These firms then receive additional tariff pro­
tection. Like integration industries, these concessions 
must be written up in the form of a protocol and are subject 
to ratification by the member countries.^
A selected industry must be one which produces 
goods that are not currently manufactured in the area. The 
increased duty does not become effective until it is estab­
lished that the production of the article has begun and 
that there exists sufficient capacity to satisfy 50 per cent 
of the area's demand. Unlike integration industries, these 
firms are not legal monopolies. There is apparently no 
limit on the number of competitive plants which may enjoy 
these rights. The only aspect of control in the Special 
System is the right of the Executive Council to raise and
plower duties as it deems necessary.
^Cinco Affos de Labores en la Intearacidn EcondmiCa- 
, p. 52.
^Wardlaw, o p . cit., p. 77.
C snt roamsricans ^ ^
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In spite of its relative infancy, this program has 
met with some success. The first plant to receive the privi* 
leges of the system is located in El Salvador and produces 
electric light bulbs. This plant began operations in April, 
1965. In February, I967, a glass factory in Guatemala City 
was also incorporated under the system. Three additional 
firms producing machetes were designated in April, 1967, 
bringing the total to five.^ In addition, there are many 
firms which are currently applying for special protection, 
and there is a good possibility that the near future will 
see even more.
The Special System is not as complicated as the 
Integration Industries Scheme, Since the firms are not 
legal monopolies, there is less need for controls. The 
safeguard for the consumer is the power of the Executive 
Council to reduce tariffs if prices are excessively high 
and to allow foreign competition to force regional prices 
back into line.2
The Special System is really nothing more than an 
attempt to protect infant industries. Firms agree to 
supply a certain percentage of area demand, and they are
, ^Informe Sobre los Avances del Programa de Integra- 
cion Economioa Centroamericana. pp. 9-10.
^The tariff established under the Special System 
is high. In the case of electric light bulbs, the external 
tariff is approximately $1.00 specific and 10 per cent ad 
valorem. The usual rate is approximately 20 cents specific 
and 10 per cent ad valorem. See Wardlaw, op. cit.. p. 80.
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rewarded by protection from foreign competition. This 
mechanism is appealing because it tends to attract entre­
preneurs and also because governments are rather quickly 
convinced about its desirability, especially since 
increased tariff revenue may result.
Assembling Industries and Textile Development
The remaining agreements established to promote 
industry are still in an embryonic stage. An assembling 
industries program was intended to be a special section of 
the Convention on Fiscal Incentives, Since this convention 
has not been accepted, new proposals are being considered 
for the development of assembling industries. Currently, 
ICAITI is examining the possibility of industries special­
izing in the assembly of various products into a final 
unit.̂
A special program for building the textile industry 
in Central America is also under consideration. Although 
textiles are currently produced, the industry is apparently 
pot of sufficient size to fulfill the regional demand for 
these products. In collaboration with the United Nations, 
Central America is planning to increase its capacity for 
textile production. Preliminary analyses have been com­
pleted which estimate regional demand and the necessary
^Cinco Anos de Labores en la Integraoion Economica 
Centroamericana. p. 94%
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investment to expand production»^
The assembling industries and textile development 
constitute special programs which are aimed at specific 
aspects of Central America's industrial base. Like the 
Integration Industries Scheme, these are examples of 
planned industrial development. Since investment in 
developing areas is usually not a spontaneous reflex, as 
many would hope, such projects have a great deal of merit.
The Role of Integration Industries 
Even though there are a number of projects associ­
ated with industrial development in Central America, none 
has met with a great deal of success. Still, however, most 
of the programs are needed. For example, the concept of 
economic integration implies a unified system of fiscal 
incentives. As long as each country continues to use its 
own tools for incentives, development will proceed princi­
pally on a national basis. A coordinated fiscal program 
can help countries become an integrated unit.
The Integration Industries Scheme is not in oppo­
sition to the Convention on Fiscal Incentives. The two 
programs complement each other. That is, there are numer­
ous small industries in Central America whose growth may 
respond to tariff and/or tax privileges. General fiscal 
incentives connotate a diverse, unplanned attempt at
^Informe Sobre los Avances del Programa de Inte- 
gracion Economica Centroamericana. p. 10,
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attracting innovative activity into small manufacturing 
endeavors. An integration industry constitutes the con­
struction of medium to heavy industry. As long as inte­
gration industries are permitted to fulfill the role for 
which they were conceived, these two programs can easily 
exist side by side. These systems are not diametrically 
opposed but, rather, seek to accomplish separate goals.
This is also true in the case of more specific 
development plans, such as textiles and assembling indus­
tries, In fact, these plans could conceivably be included 
under the Integration Industries Scheme, depending upon 
the state of regional demand. However, if it is possible 
for competition to exist, there is no good reason to avoid 
it.
Although the Special System for the Promotion of 
Production has been the most successful (or least unsuc­
cessful) regional industrial mechanism, this is the program 
which is most in conflict with the Integration Industries 
Scheme. The theoretical aspects of the Special System are 
unclear. For example, there are already three firms pro­
ducing machetes; and since each firm is required to be of 
sufficient capacity to satisfy 50 per cent of area demand, 
two firms should be able to meet the demand of the entire 
market.
There is apparently no limitation on the number of 
firms in one industry which can operate under the system.
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Therefore, the requirement that each firm be able to pro­
duce 50 per cent of area demand may cause a situation of 
over capacity. Contrariwise, if there is only one firm 
assigned under the system, this, in effect, is a grant of 
monopoly power. The result is the establishment of a firm 
in the same market situation as an integration industry 
but without the aspects of control. The only control main­
tained by the Executive Council is discretion over tariff 
policy.
The main benefits of the Special System are that it 
is relatively easy to implement and easy to operate. The 
firms prefer it because they are less restricted, and the 
market authorities are attracted to it because of its sim­
plicity and because it seems to work when other programs 
have failed.
The Special System may be able to partially substi­
tute for the lack of a generally accepted program of fiscal 
incentives. Yet, it appears that it cannot effectively 
replace the Integration Industries Scheme. As long as 
there are products which can only be produced with rela­
tive efficiency by a single plant because of demand limita­
tions, integration industries should continue to exist.
If new plants in the same industry are liberally 
designated under the Special System (with high tariffs), 
a large number of them may be able to survive due to 
excessive pricing. However, this will probably create
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excess capacity, and consumers will experience a reduction 
in real income. On the other hand, the designation of only 
one plant would not allow the competitive factor, upon 
which the system largely depends, to be brought into opera­
tion. The main question is the determination of the number 
of firms in any one industry that Central America can sup­
port, given its small total market. If at any given time 
the market can support only one, then the Integration Indus­
tries Scheme should be used.
As long as the Special System is applied to small- 
scale operations, it may be in harmony with integration 
industries. If it begins to replace the scheme (which 
seems to be a possibility), the result is likely to be 
abused tariff protection combined with over capacity.
Each of the programs established to develop the 
industrial base of Central America is défendable. There 
is little doubt that the most important consideration in 
the short run is whether or not a system works. Still, 
none of the alternative programs replaces or invalidates 
the concepts supporting the Integration Industries Scheme. 
The Economic Commission for Latin America continues to be 
interested in promoting a vigorous and intensive applica­
tion of the Agreement on Integration Industries.^ For 
large as well as many medium-sized industries, there
^Evaluacion de la Integraoion Econĉ mica en Centro- 
america. p. 159.
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initially appears to be no logical alternative other than 
regional monopolies.
Equally as clear, however, is the fact that effi­
ciency and welfare criteria are not sufficient tests of 
an industrial program. If the scheme cannot be made ^ 
operative, its theoretical aspects will tend to become 
meaningless. Some means must be found to improve the 
designation and regulatory processes of the scheme.
Suggestions for Consideration
Improving the Designation 
Process
Certainly the most critical improvement needed in 
the legal framework of the program is the removal of legis­
lative ratification. There appears to be no way to effec­
tively implement the program if each of the countries main­
tains this last chance to approve or disapprove integration 
industries. The ratification requirement increases the 
amount of time needed to designate new Industries and 
enhances uncertainty for entrepreneurs. It is true that 
this clause was incorporated into the agreement to protect 
the sovereignty of the individual nations and to insure the 
incidence of reciprocity in the Central American region. 
Although the aspects of reciprocity cannot be neglected, 
they should not be permitted to be restrictive enough to 
restrain the regional development program.^
^Reciprocity constitutes a perplexing problem for 
integration movements among developing countries. One
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As a short-run measure, the repeal of the above- 
mentioned clause would be of considerable importance. Over 
a period of time, however, it is the opinion of this author 
that the system should be entirely revised.
As the mechanism presently operates, the Executive 
Council is the center of activity. Every protocol and 
decision emanates from this body. The duties and responsi­
bilities of this organism are far too inclusive. The Inte­
gration Industries Program is actually only a small part 
of the workload of the Executive Council.
This points to the need for a specialized industrial 
commission. ECLA recommended the development of such an 
organ at the inception of the scheme.^ It is now becoming
cannot expect a country to experience a large trade deficit 
and a low rate of growth without becoming disenchanted with 
integration. Therefore, policy measures need to be readily 
available to aid the less fortunate countries. In severe 
cases, temporary quantitative controls may be necessary. 
More generally, however, regional aid programs from such 
institutions as the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration should come into play. It is interesting to 
note that one form of aid could be directly associated with 
the Integration Industries Scheme. In this regard, it has 
been suggested by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
that Honduras be allowed to develop a special series of 
integration industries. This is not possible as long as 
the scheme continues to be unsuccessful. On the other hand, 
an acceptance of this method of aid would most likely 
reverse the attitude of Honduras toward this program.
Hence, one of the important bottlenecks facing the ̂ system^ 
would be released. See Evaluacion de la Integraoion Econo­
mics en Centroamerica. p. 159*
^Naciones Unidas, Comision Economics Para America 
Latina, Comité de Cooperacion Econdmica del Istmo Centro- 
americano, Analtsis de las Medidas v Altemativas Para 
Poner en Vigor el Rdgimen de Indu strias Centroamericana s 
de Intsgracldn (E/CN.12/CSE/166, August 12, 1959) (New York, 
1959), p. 1.
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of paramount Importance, This council could consist of 
representatives from each country who are familiar with 
industrial development problems in Central America, But, 
in particular, it should maintain a staff of competent 
people who are know"! ndgeable about technical considerations 
in industrial de\ .̂ opment.
This proposed industrial commission would become 
the working body of the industrial movement in Central 
America. A close-working relationship with the Permanent 
Secretariat (SIECA) and the Research Institute (ICAITI) 
would be instrumental. In fact, it is logical that the 
Industrial commission become a specific branch of SIECA 
with minor decision-making powers. The handling and pro­
cessing of applications should be left entirely to the 
commission. Only after the protocols are drawn up should 
the Executive Council be needed. The decision of the 
Executive Council should be considered as final but sub­
ject to review by the Economic Council.
The Research Institute should also play a more 
poignant role in implementing the scheme. Under the 
current arrangement, ICAITI undertakes research projects 
at the request of the Executive Council. This occurs 
after the firm deposits an application at the Permanent 
Secretariat and the Executive Council puts a preliminary 
stamp of approval on the project. As a consequence, unless 
studies are completed by the firm, the magnitude of demand
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and resource availability for producing a product are 
initially unknown. This lack of knowledge may act as a 
disincentive to potential entrepreneurs.
The industrialization process would seem to be 
more efficient if the Research Institute would act as a 
point of departure. That is, this organization should 
continually be undertaking industrial feasibility studies 
in order to determine the logical pattern which industry 
should follow. As projects are completed, the information 
could be supplied to possible entrepreneurs, and investors 
could, in this manner, be made aware of the areas in which 
there is potential innovative activity.
The implementation of the Integration Industries 
Scheme, then, should center basically around three organs. 
The proposed industrial commission, operating through the 
Permanent Secretariat, would be the working body; ICAITI, 
the research organism; and the Executive Council, the final 
decision-making entity. The Economic Council need not 
perform a significant role; rather, it should only act as 
an organ of final appeal. The designation process could be 
improved considerably if these three bodies were allowed to 
implement the Integration Industries Scheme.
Improving the Regulatory Mechanism 
If and when new integration industries are desig­
nated in significant numbers, the problem of monopoly regu­
lation will beocms substantial. This Is especially true
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if each of the industries is forced to adhere to specific 
rules and regulations written into the protocols. The 
solution to this problem is the determination of a weapon 
of control which is sufficient to prevent monopoly abuse 
but flexible enough to prevent litigation over countless 
regulations. Certainly the present system, with its many 
control devices, is too inflexible and cumbersome. There 
is admittedly no simple solution. Yet, it does appear 
that there ere some logical and relatively efficient 
avenues available.
The Permanent Secretariat apparently does not 
regularly receive annual reports of the operations of inté­
grât i#i industries,^ This is unfortunate because periodic 
analyses of sales and costs of production seem to be one 
of the most logical methods of regulation. If the Executive 
Council could agree on what constitutes a reasonable rate 
of return for a year's operations, such examinations could 
reveal whether or not firms are earning monopoly profits.
If profits were to exceed a reasonable rate of return, the 
prices of the products sold by the integration plant could 
be lowered accordingly. Subsequently, the outside tariff 
could be reduced by the amount of the price decline. In
^The author attempted to procure copies of the 
Annual Operational Report of the tire and tube plant at 
the Office of the Permanent Secretariat, but the Secre­
tariat did not have this information and could not pro­
cure it.
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this manner, the benefits of the enlarged market could be 
passed on to the consumer and not exist only for the 
producer.
The other regulatory power needed would be control 
over the external tariff. If quality standards of inte­
gration firms are low or products are not being supplied 
in adequate quantities, the industrial commission should 
be able to relax tariffs and allow foreign companies on 
the market at competitive prices. During infancy, inte­
gration firms should be accorded reasonable protection. 
Yet, the ultimate goal over time ought to be the complete 
relaxation of the common tariff.
It is the belief of the author that regulatory 
powers consisting of oost-and-profit evaluation and dis­
cretionary tariff policy would be sufficient to do an 
effective job of preventing most abuses of monopoly.
Other specific problems which arise could be handled on 
an individual basis. The regulatory process would become 
more flexible and could be implemented with less effort.
Each of the suggestions above is made in a general 
sense on the basis of efficiency and welfare criteria. 
Although the scheme should provide incentives for entre­
preneurs, the benefits to the producer should not be at 
the expense of consumers. Producers are entitled to a 
fair rate of return; yet, should the opportunity arise, 
they are unlikely to pass up the chance for more profits.
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Periodic audits combined with discretionary tariff policy 
can allow benefits for producers and, at the same time, 
protect the interests of the consumer.
The Next Decade 
Through a study of the Integration Industries 
Scheme, some of the important problems which characterize 
integration movements among developing areas have been pre­
sented. Perhaps the most significant reason for the prob­
lems which have arisen in Central America is the absence 
of a regional attitude which is conducive to the develop­
ment of the overall integration area. Each of the countries 
maintains nationalistic motivations and seemingly believes 
that one country cannot grow unless another stagnates. 
Consequently, the concept of regional balance and reciproc­
ity permeates decision making. The Integration Industries 
Scheme reflects this sort of attitude.
The successful initiation of reform measures to 
improve the Integration Industries Scheme will largely be 
determined by the prevailing attitudes of individual coun­
tries, If each of the members prefers to retain protective 
clauses which allow one country to significantly influence 
the success of the program, then the needed reforms will 
probably not evolve. On the other hand, if- adequate- 
flexibility can be built into the scheme, this would be a 
step forward in bringing about a regional development 
ethic.
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The future of the Integration Industries Scheme 
depends upon the addition of new elasticity to the desig­
nation and regulatory processes. If necessary measures are 
not implemented, it seems probable that the mechanism will 
fall into disuse. In this event, the Central American 
Integration Program will have experienced, for the first 
time, an important setback.
Summary
Central America has conceived several programs 
aimed at building its industrial base. Since the Inception 
of the Integration Industries Scheme in 1958, four addi­
tional agreements have evolved. The Agreement on Fiscal 
Incentives, signed in I962, has not gone into effect 
because of the Honduran problem. Special programs aimed 
at stimulating certain industrial categories— the assem­
bling and textile industries— are currently in their 
infancy.
The most successful mechanism has been the so-called 
Special System for the Promotion of Production. This system 
attempts to initiate regional industrial growth through 
external tariff protection. Because it is relatively easy 
to implement and operate, this system has met with reason­
able success.
The Special System can probably substitute for the 
lack of a general agreement on fiscal incentives; yet, it
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cannot effectively displace the theory in support of the 
Integration Industries Scheme, As long as Central America 
continues to be a small market, the Integration Industries 
Scheme should be a significant part of the Industrial 
movement.
Suggestions were made to improve the operation of 
the scheme. Improved efficiency in the designation process 
"depends upon the repeal of the ratification requirement. 
Other important improvements would be the development of 
an industrial commission to act as the working body for the 
designation and regulation of integration industries. It 
is also suggested that the Research Institute act as a 
point of departure in the designation process and that the 
Executive Council be the main decision-making body of the 
scheme. The regulatory aspects should be carried out by 
the industrial commission through studies of costs of pro­
duction and discretionary control over tariffs.
It is difficult to ascertain whether or not the 
Integration Industries Scheme will be revised in the near 
future. If the individual countries continue to be con­
cerned only with national development, improvements prob­
ably will not evolve. In this event, the Integration 
Industries Program may fall into complete disuse.
CEAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has been concerned with the concept of 
economic integration as it relates to the developing areas. 
It has assumed that industrialization is a desirable avenue 
of development policy in Central America and, accordingly, 
has examined a particular tool for regional industrial 
growth within the context of economic integration,
A detailed analysis of this tool, called the Inte­
gration Industries Scheme, was preceded by a short summary 
of the theory of economic integration and also a brief 
evaluation of the Central American integration movement.
The theory of integration was approached from the 
point of view of the possible benefits and drawbacks which 
characterize economic integration. It was concluded that 
the most substantive innovation in this area was made by 
Jacob Viner, He concludes that customs unions are not 
desirable unless they result in overall trade creation 
and do not merely divert trade from external to internal 
sources. As it relates to developed economies, this 
criterion is logical and consistent,
-  -
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It was further concluded, however, that most 
current integration theory is not as applicable to move» 
ment8 among underdeveloped economies as it is to integra» 
tion in developed areas. The relevant consideration for 
developing areas is not the condition of world trade but, 
rather, the usefulness of integration as a tool to promote 
a better climate for economic development. Consequently, 
an additional set of criteria are needed to evaluate inte­
gration movements in these areas. The conclusion follows 
that these criteria ought not revolve around the condition 
of world trade but, instead, the determination of the 
impact of integration on growth and development.
One of the most successful attempts at economic 
integration among developing economies has taken place in 
Central America, It was discovered that a regional devel­
opment scheme is logical in this small isthmus, mainly 
because it is composed of countries too small to maintain 
viable economic units. Integration has been accepted as 
one method to alleviate the important bottleneck of size 
in Central America. As a consequence, the General Treaty 
of Economic Integration was signed in I96O. This con­
firmed the organization of the Central American integra­
tion scheme, the ultimate goal being the attainment of a 
common market.
Generally speaking. Central America experienced a 
successful embryonic period. The institutional framework
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conducive to regional Integration was well underway by the 
early sixties.. The release of tariff barriers was rapid; 
and regional trade responded well. Increasing by more than 
300 per cent between I96O and 1965. The regional economy 
showed a high growth rate for thé first half'of the decade. 
The Initial Impact of Integration favorably affected 
Central America; yet. It was concluded that the role of 
this movement In Influencing the level of growth and devel­
opment In Central America will not be known for at least 
an additional five years.
Despite early success. Central America Is charac­
terized by numerous Important bottlenecks which have the 
effect of restraining the regional movement. The body of 
this study was specifically oriented toward a case study 
of perhaps the least successful program of the Common 
Market~the Integration Industries Scheme. This subject 
was approached from the point of view of being a new 
experiment In Industrial development and was, therefore, 
examined both on a theoretical and practical basls=— each 
with the goal of gaining Insight Into the problems of 
economic development within the framework of economic 
Integration.
First of all, a description, theoretical analysis, 
and brief history of the Integration Industries Scheme 
were undertaken. The Integration Industries Agreement, 
signed In 1958, was Intended to develop those Industries
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which require a large sales volume in order to operate 
under conditions pf efficiency. This was to be a type of 
planned industrial development which takes advantage of 
the enlarged market resulting from integration. Integra­
tion industries are to be designated on the basis of the 
size of regional demand and the availability of adequate 
resources.
The various Incentive devices for attracting entre­
preneurs were explained to be; exemptions from duties on 
production inputs, freedom from taxation, a protective 
extemal tariff, and protection from possible internal 
competition. Regulatory conditions to curb the abuse of 
monopoly power included such factors as control over prices, 
quality, and distribution policy. The designation proce­
dure for firms seeking integration status was found to be 
long and arduous. Each integration firm faces the uncer­
tainty of approval by the Permanent Secretariat (SIECA), 
the Research Institute (ICAITI), the Executive Council, 
the Economic Council, and finally, by three of the member 
countries. To insure balanced industrial development, a 
clause was included in the treaty which stated that a 
country could not receive two integration industries 
until each country received at least one.
Although the initial agreement was hoped to be an 
important device to promote regional industrial growth, 
in reality, it was characterized by numerous constraining
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factors which have tended to restrict the success of the 
program. During the first ten years of operation, only 
two integration industries have been approved, and then 
only by four of the member countries. These consist of a 
tire and tube plant located in Guatemala and caustic soda 
and insecticides plants constructed in Nicaragua. Although 
a glass factory has been designated for Honduras, only one 
country has approved this protocol.
During 1966 and 1967, the Integration Industries 
Scheme experienced a new flourish of applications. The 
reason for the new interest was speculated to be a new 
interpretation by the Economic Council of the restrictive 
article on balanced growth. However, no additional proto­
cols have, as yet, been adopted.
The most perplexing problems facing the scheme were 
discovered to be not so much of a theoretical nature^ but.
A limited empirical study of the theory supporting 
integration industries is presented in Appendix A. This 
constitutes a case study of the tire and tube plant located 
in Guatemala City. Information is presented on the changes 
in output and sales of GINSA precipitated by the enlarged 
market. This firm was able to more than double its sales 
within a period of less than two years. Still, however, 
the absolute volume of imports of tires and tubes into 
Central America from outside sources was found to be high.
An analysis of the effect of the increased output 
of the firm on its production costs was limited because of 
inadequate data. On the basis of available information, it 
is projected that the enlarged market did not bring about a 
substantial reduction in unit costs. This conclusion is 
reached principally because of the short time period 
involved. It is further concluded that additional informa­
tion is needed before any^definitive statement could be made 
about economies of scale in^this and other integration firms,
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instead, of a practical and political character. Two major 
problem areas were discussed. The first of these was con­
cerned with the policies and attitudes which affect the 
implementation of industrial development on a regional 
basis. It was explained that two clauses, both political 
in origin, have been instrumental in restraining the pro­
gram— the first being the country-by-country ratification 
requirement and the second being the balanced growth doc­
trine, Although the negative attitude of the United States 
has been accused of restraining the Integration Industries 
Scheme, a conclusion was reached that this influence has 
been of comparatively little significance.
Because Honduras has been adversely affected by 
integration, this country has developed a hostile attitude 
toward the scheme. None of the existing protocols has been 
ratified by Honduras, Until special benefits and aid are 
accorded, the entire integration program will be restrained 
by this member. Because of the strong concern over national 
sovereignty on the part of member countries, sufficient 
conditions were incorporated in the Integration Industries 
Agreement to allow a single country to significantly affect 
the success of regional industrialization. It was concluded 
that the attitude of Honduras reflects the general preoccu­
pation with balanced development in Central America,
The second general problem area discussed was con­
cerned with the regulatory aspects of the Integration
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Industries Scheme. The small number of integration indus­
tries now in operation has not brought this problem com­
pletely to the surface; yet, an examination of the relations 
between market authorities and one of the existing firms 
revealed that the addition of new integration industries 
would accentuate the ineptness of the current regulatory 
mechanism. It was explained that the Integration Industries 
Scheme is characterized by an important dilemma; that is, 
the aspects of control cannot be stringent enough to dis­
courage the use of the program. On the other hand, they 
must be of such a degree to prevent the utilization of 
monopoly power,
In addition to integration industries, other pro­
jects have been developed to promote regional industrial­
ization, These include a regional system of fiscal 
incentives, specialized plans for the development of 
textiles and assembling industries, and a so-called Spe­
cial System for the Promotion of Production, The goals 
and the progress of these mechanisms were discussed for 
the purpose of ascertaining the role of the Integration 
Industries Scheme in Central American industrial 
development,
It was discovered that a regional system of fiscal 
incentives has not yet been approved. Plans oriented 
toward textiles and assembling industries are still in 
their infancy. However, the Special System for the
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Promotion of Production has turned out to be the most suc­
cessful regional program to date. The Special System con­
sists of special tariff protection from outside countries 
on the basis of the infant industry argument.
A subsequent evaluation of these programs indi­
cated that a regional system of fiscal incentives and 
specialized plans to promote textiles and assembling indus­
tries do not tend to replace but, rather, support the Inte­
gration Industries Scheme. On the other hand, it was 
reasoned that the Special System for the Promotion of 
Production could result in a general condition of produc­
tion overcapacity, mainly because it depends upon the 
existence of competition— a luxury which the limited 
Central American market cannot support. Since this mecha­
nism contains no regulatory apparatus, it may have the 
effect of attracting those firms which should be classi­
fied as integration industries.
A conclusion was reached that none of the regional 
industrial mechanisms can effectively replace the Integra­
tion Industries Scheme. This conclusion was based upon 
the fact that the small market of Central America can 
initially support, in many fields, only one firm.
Suggestions were made to improve the implementa- 
tional and regulatory aspects of the scheme. As a pre­
liminary step, it was recommended that the ratification 
requirement be immediately removed. An alternative plan
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aimed at improving the overall efficiency of the system 
was also presented. The creation of an industrial commis­
sion was considered to be of extreme importance. This 
organization should take over the implementational and the 
regulatory aspects of the program. It was further sug­
gested that the regulation of integration industries be 
streamlined through periodic evaluations of production 
costs and profits*
A projection was made that the future prospects for 
the Integration Industries Scheme will be highly dependent 
upon the initiation of reform measures and the subsequent 
relaxation of extreme nationalistic motivations. If the 
Integration Industries Scheme is not revised within the 
next decade, it is unlikely that it will become an impor­
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APPENDIX A
THE EFFECTS OF AN ENLARGED MARKET: 
THE CASE OF GINSA
Introduction
The main theoretlQal condition of the Integration 
Industries Scheme is based on what seems to be good logic.
It is assumed that economic integration brings about the 
existence of an enlarged market and that this factor is 
conducive to the occurrence of economies of large-scale 
production. This remains to be subjected to empirical 
examination. Few attempts have been made to determine the 
magnitude of sales increases experienced by firms operating 
in an integration area. Even less effort has been directed 
toward an evaluation of the impact of increased sales upon 
plant efficiency.
Data are not sufficiently available to undertake a 
detailed study of these phenomena. However, the author was 
able to collect some empirical evidence while doing research 
in Central America. This appendix attempts to present these 
data in a meaningful manner.
Appendix A consists of an examination of the output, 
sales, and costs of production experienced by GINSA before
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and after it became an integration industry. An effort is 
made to determine the extent to which this firm has been 
able to attract the demand historically expressed through 
the import sector. Although the statistics necessary to 
study costs of production are insufficient to be conclusive, 
an attempt is made to determine whether or not decreases in 
per unit costs were incurred because of GIüTSA’s increased 
sales volume.
Theoretical Considerations 
Literature on the theoretical effects of increased 
market size is relatively abundant. An important part of 
economic integration theory is centered around this phenome­
non. Economic integration will bring about both a consump­
tion effect and a production effect. Although analysis of 
a static nature can be applied to these phenomena, much of 
the effect of integration on production and consumption is 
of a dynamic nature. That is, over a period of time, it is
I
maintained tiiat the firm pan become more efficient and that 
consumers can benefit from this through lower prices.
These dynamic effects are precipitated by the 
increased sales volume which is experienced by firms resid­
ing in an integration area. With larger sales, productive 
units can produce at a capacity conducive to lower per unit 
costs, assuming that economies of large-scale production 
exist. Eventually, the consumer benefits from the reduced 
costs through lower prices. The degree of consumer benefits
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will be determined by the amount of competition and/or 
monopoly regulation.
The magnitude of an enlarged market and the result­
ing benefits derived from this phenomenon are rather obscure 
in developing areas. Although total demand for a given pro­
duct can be roughly determined, the elasticity of this 
demand toward the import sector is subject to considerable 
uncertainty in spite of an external tariff. It may take a 
high tariff to shift consumption to internal sources, 
especially if imported products are superior in quality 
or assumed to be superior.
If demand is completely shifted to internal pro­
duction, the resulting cost benefits are also uncertain, 
mainly because they depend upon the existence of an adequate 
economic infrastructure, financial institutions, techno­
logical knowhow, as well as other variables. These may or 
may not exist. More than likely they will be inadequate. 
Such institutional factors tend to cloud the theoretical 
issues involved.
A special problem often arises when attempts are 
made to examine sales and costs of production of integra­
tion industries. That is, integration firms are usually 
not constructed until they have been accorded the privi­
leges of the Integration Industries Scheme. Hence, these 
firms actually begin operations in infancy within the 
context of the Common Marketc There is, consequently, no
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means of measuring, on a beforehand-after basis, the impact 
of the enlarged market on firm efficiency. "
In the case of the tire and tube plant, this problem 
is averted. GINSA produced within the Guatemalan market for 
approximately five years before it received integration 
status. Hence, this provides an opportunity to determine 
the magnitude of the change in demand for the products of 
the firm and the subsequent effect upon its costs of 
production.
A Historical Survey of GINSA 
The tire and tube plant of Guatemala was founded on 
March 14, 1956, under the title of "General Tire and Incatecu, 
S.A, (GINSA)." The firm was constructed for the purpose of 
producing tires, tubes, camelback, masterbatch, boots, shoe 
soles, shoe heels, and rubber plates. Production began in 
1958 with an agreement to utilize the technology of the 
General Tire and Rubber Company of Akron, Ohio. The initial 
capacity of ths plant was approximately 120,000 tires and
96,000 tubes. In 1963, the official title of the firm was 
changed to "Gran Industria de Neumaticos Centroamericanos,
S.A," but continued to be abbreviated as GINSA.^
^Honduras, Consejo pjecutivo, Vigesimonovena 
Reunion, septiembre 17-20, 1^67, Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana, 
Opinion Sobre si una Planta Acogida al Convenio Sobre el 
Regimen de Industrias Puede Dedicarse a la Manufactura de 
Articules Distintos de Aguellos que se Mencionan Ep>resa- 
mente en el Correspondiente Protocole (SIECA/CE-XXIX/D.T.22. 
September 1̂ , 1967/ (Guatemala, 1967), PP» 6-8.
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The Initial paid-in capital in 1956 was #1,000,000. 
Since 1956 the firm has increased its capital four different 
times, and by March, 1963, it reached a total of #3,500,000. 
The current distribution of capital among private investors 
by country is as follows: Guatemala— 66.01^; Costa Rica—
14.45#; El Salvador— 8.97#Î Nicaragua— 1,36#; Honduras—
.02#; and Foreign— 9.19#,^
On January 29, I963, GINSA was declared an integra­
tion industry. It received all the privileges and benefits 
of the scheme with respect to the production of tires and 
tubes. GINSA could not begin operations under the auspices 
of the treaty until three of the contracting states rati­
fied the protocol. Consequently, GINSA did not begin 
tariff-free sales in Costa Rica and El Salvador until July 1, 
1965, and in Nicaragua on October 1, 1965*̂  Honduras, of 
course, has not ratified the protocol and still maintains 
tariff duties on tires and tubes coming from Guatemala.
In accordance with Article XXII of the first proto­
col, GINSA was obligated to increase its capacity to 225,000 
tires and 180,000 tubes. This addition was to be completed 
one year after the protocol legally went into effect or by 
February, 1966, Although the protocol requires that the
^Ibld., p. 7.
^Interview with Mr, Dennis Downing, Treasurer of 
GINSA, Guatemala City, Guatemala, October 29, 1967*
3lbid.
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firm be able to produce only 225»000 tires, GINSA maintains 
(as of 1967) that it has undergone sufficient changes in 
the si?e of the plant to constitute a maximum capacity of
300,000 tires,^
In teims of employment, GINSA paid a monthly average 
of 393 employees in November, 1963* As of I967, this fig­
ure had risen to 603* Approximately 98 per cent of these 
workers are from Guatemala, the remaining 2 per cent being 
foreign.2
The Magnitude of Regional Demand
Production and Sales of Tires 
GINSA officially began negotiations for integration 
status almost immediately after the Integration Industries 
Treaty was signed. The period of time which lapsed until 
it received this position was approximately seven years. 
Consequently, GINSA has produced in response to Central 
America*s demand for less than two years (I965-1966),
Table 9 contains data on the production and sales 
of GINSA for three relevant years— I96I, 1964, and 1966,̂
The data of this table provide a comparison of the
^Comentarios de la Secretaria a la Exposicion del 
Gobiemo de Guatemala, p. 6.
^Interview with Mr, Dennis Downing, on. oit.
3Data for the years I962, 1963, and I965 were not 
available.
TABLE 9












1961* 90,000 —— 63,697 —
1964 102,895 14 88.992 40





®'The accounting period for GINSA is from December 1 to November 30.
SOURCE: Data for I96I from: Guatemala, Consejo Ejecutivo, Segunda Reunion, 
dici^mbre IO-15, 1962, Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integracion 
Economica Centroamericana, Estudio de Evaluaoion Tecnica-Economica de la Fabrica 
de Llantas y Camaras para Automovil (SIECA/cE-II/DoT.2. November 26, 1962) (Guate­
mala, 1962), Annex 21# Data for 1964 from:” Nicaragua, Consejo Economico, Deci­
motercera Reunion Erbraordiiiaria, junio 15-20, I966, Secretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integracion Econdmica Centroamericana, Solieitud de Guatemala 
(Llantas) (SIECA/CEC-XIII.E/D,T.7, October 13. 1965) (Guatemala, 196^)^ Annex 3; Data for 1966 from: Honduras, Consejo Ejecutivo, Vigesimonovena Reunion, sep­
tiembre 17-20, 1967, Seoretarla Permanente del Tratado General de Integracion 
Econdmica Centroamericana. Opinion Sobre si una Planta Acogida al Convenio Sobre 
el Regimen de Industrias Puede Dedicarse a la Manufactura de Articules Distintos 
de Aguellos que se Mencionan Expresamente en el Correspondiente Protocole (SIECA/ 
CE-XXIX/D.T.22, September l4, 1967) (Guatemala, I967)» PP« 6-6.
" 1 6̂ •*
production and sales of GINSA within the Guatemalan market 
(1961 and 1964) to that of the entire Common Market (I966), 
During the period from 1961-1964, GINSA increased 
its production by approximately l4 per cent. During the 
same period, sales increased by 40 per cent.^ Although the 
production change was not large, GINSA was able to make 
substantial headway in the Guatemalan market with respect 
to sales. These sales were consumated under the protection 
of a national tariff of 60 cents specific and 50 per cent 
ad valorem (cif).^
The initial effect of the Common Market can be 
ascertained by observing the data for I966. GINSA sold 
tires and tubes tariff free in Central America (excepting 
in Honduras) during the entire year of 1966. The data 
indicate that from 1964 to 1966 tire production increased 
83 per cent and sales increased 93 per cent. It appears 
as if the short-term effect of the Common Market was signifi­
cant even though GINSA was in the process of making Inroads 
into the market area.
The inventories of the firm seem rather high, 
particularly in I96I and 1964. These inventories were 
apparently being built up in anticipation of increased 
sales when the firm received integration status.
Naciones Unidas, Comision EconcSmica Para America 
Latina, Comite de Cooperacion Economica del Istmo Centro- 
americano, Grupo de Trabajo ad hoc Sobre Desarrollo Indus­
trial, Derechos Aduaneros Vigentes en Los Paises Centro- 
amerieanos (November 28. 1961) (New York. 1961). p. 6.
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Imports of Tires and Tubes 
The increase In production and sales of GINSA indi­
cated in Table 9 could not logically be entirely attributed 
to the single market of Guatemala. However, these data do 
not give information regarding the magnitude of the change 
in operations directly caused by the Common Market. There­
fore, to obtain some idea of the amount of the change in 
demand for GINSA*s products brought about by the Common 
Market, it would be useful to examine the imports of tires 
and tubes of the respective countries of Central America 
from Guatemala. Since GINSA was the only firm producing 
tires and tubes in Central America until 1967, such infor­
mation should be revealing. In accordance with the first 
protocol, the common external tariff was set at 90 cents 
specific axsl 10 per cent ad valorem.^
Data in Table 10 show the imports of tires and 
tubes from Guatemala, by value; of four Central American 
countries during the period from 1964 to 1966,̂  The 
imports of all countries during 1964 (when the tariff wall 
still existed) are relatively small. Data concerning 
imports for I965 show a slight increase, with the excep- 
’"tion of Nicaragua which imported less in I965 than in 1964.
- ^Arancel de Aduanas Centroamericana (Guatemala:, 
Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integracion 
Economica de Centroamerica, 1966), p. 6-12,
^Data for the years 196I through I963 were either 
inadequate or not available.
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TABLE 10
IMPORTS PROM GUATEMALA OF TIRES AND TUBES 
OP POUR CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES,
BY VALUE, ANNUALLY, 1964-1966 
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1964 1965 1966
TOTAL $1,381.799 $1,807,810 $4,781,106
Costa Rica 275,974 595,454 2,175,183
El Salvador 525.903 654,631 1,615,122
Nicaragua 225,274 20,537 623,652
Honduras 354,648 537,188 367,149
SOURCE: Anuarlo Estadl̂ stlco Centroamericano de
Comerclo Exterior. 1964-1966 (Guatemala; Secretaria 
Permanente del Tratado General de Integracidn Econdmica 
Centroamericana, I966), Nauca 629-01-02.
This may be due to the following. The Nicaraguan govern­
ment;, having to give up tariff revenue on imported tires 
from outside countries, wanted to compensate for this loss 
by taxing the imports of tires from Guatemala. GINSA could 
not come to any agreement with Nicaragua until the end of 
1965.̂  This possibly accounts for the small amount of 
trade with Nicaragua during that year.
In spite of the perceptible decrease in the case 
of Nicaragua, total trade increased in 1965. This seems 
reasonable since GINSA was accorded the regional market
^Interview with Mr. Dennis Downing, op. cit.
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during the latter part of the year. In 1966, however, a 
more substantial effect is noticeable. Total imports were 
more than two-and-one-half times the figure for 1965* Costa 
Rica and El Salvador are the major new markets although the 
increase in the case of Nicaragua is also considerable. 
Consequently, the regional market was at least partially 
responsible for the increased sales and output which char­
acterized the integration plant during 1966, The peculiar 
case of Honduras helps to confirm this statement. Since 
Honduras has not lowered duties, her imports from Guatemala 
showed no important change and, in fact, decreased slightly 
in 1966.
There is one more avenue left to be investigated. 
Even though the demand for GINSA*s tires and tubes notice­
ably increased, this does not necessarily imply that imports 
were shifted from external sources to internal production. 
One would logically expect, however, that the common exter­
nal tariff on tires and tubes would shift consumption to 
internal production.
The significance of this effect is revealed by the 
data shown in Table 11, which measures, by value, the level 
of imports of tires and tubes from outside areas. First of 
all, the imports of Guatemala need explanation even though 
they are relatively small. Since Guatemala has the inte­
gration industry on her own soil, one would expect a negli­
gible import figure, Guatemala*s imports apparently consist
— l60 —
TABLE 11
IMPORTS FROM OUTSIDE COUNTRIES OP TIRES AND TUBES 
OP FIVE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES,
BY VALUE, ANNUALLY, 1964-1966 
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1964 1965 1966
TOTAL $7,944,565 $6,844,488 $6,228,820
Costa Rica 1,857.534 1,857,251 1.213,535
El Salvador 2,352,125 1,371,248 810,731
Nicaragua 2,141,678 1,404,192 1,566,052
Honduras 1,054,986 1,401,981 1.828,996
Guatemala 548,242 809,816 807,506
SOURCE: Anuarlo Estadistioo Centroamericano de
Comercio Exterior. 1964-1966 (Guatemala: Secretaria
Permanente del Tratado General de Integracic>n Econ&mica 
Centroamericana, 1966), Nauca 629-01-02,
either of tires which are not produced by GINSA or tires 
which are imported with vehicles coming into the country.
In 1966, for example, the imports of motorized vehicles 
amounted to 1,059 units.^
An additional figure needing explanation is the 
considerable decrease in imports in I965 to Nicaragua. The 
apparent reason for this decline is an excess accumulation
^Exposicion del Gobiemo de Guatemala. Problemas 
cue afeetan a la Industria de InteKracidn--de llantas y 
neumaticos establecida en dicha Republica. p. 2.
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of stocks during 1964 in anticipation of the common external 
tariff which was to be levied in 1965.̂
Total imports from outside countries, as shown in 
Table 11, noticeably declined over the three years (1964- 
1966), However, an observation of figures for individual 
countries indicates that El Salvador is the only"country to 
have undergone a substantial decline in outside imports.
This is logical since El Salvador is geographically very 
near to Guatemala, The relatively buoyant market of Costa 
Rica also showed a noticeable decline. On the other hand, 
Honduras, which has not accepted the first protocol and 
still maintains a tariff against tires and tubes, experi­
enced a slight increase in imports,
A summary of the imports of tires and tubes from 
Guatemala and from outside countries is presented in Table 
12, This table attempts to determine the net change in 
internal and external trade in tires and tubes for the 
1964-1966 period, Honduras is excluded because it did not 
sign the first protocol. Also, since the product under 
consideration is produced in Guatemala, the imports of 
this country are not considered in Table 12,
According to the data in this table, the total 
internal trade increase between 1964 and 1965 was $243,471 
(Column 2), Yet, the external trade decrease was $1,708,646 
(Column 4)— a much larger figure. Apparently, most of the
^Interview with Kr, Dermis Down lag, ox>» olt.
TABLE 12
IMPORTS OP TIRES AND TUBES FOR THREE CENTRAL AMERICAN 
C0UNTHxE!3 FROM GUATEMALA AND OUTSIDE COUNTRIES,
BY VALUE, ANNUALLY, 1964-I966 
















































SOURCE* Adapted from Anuarlo Estadistioo Centroamerloano de Comercio 
Exterior. 1964-1966 (Guatemala* î ecretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Inte- 
graoidn Econdmica Centroamericana, I966), Nauca 629=01=02.
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countries were using up accumulated inventories during this 
period. Hence, the external trade decrease m s  not matched 
by increased purchases internally. Contrariwise, the data 
for 1965 and I966 indicate a reversal of this trend. The 
internal trade increase was $3.1^3*335 while the external 
trade decrease was $2,7^9,019. Overall, the 1964=1966 
period was marked by a trade increase in tires and tubes 
by the amount of $637,787.
This is, of course, not an earthshaking figure, and 
technically it cannot be called "trade creation" since, on 
the basis of these data, one does not know to what extent 
trade expansion occurred during the period from 1964 to 
1966, These data do indicate, however, that the common 
external tariff established under the auspices of the Inte= 
gration Industries Scheme noticeably decreased trade in 
tires and tubes with outside countries, but the removal of 
intra-Central American barriers has increased internal 
trade by a larger amount.
Although the integration firm apparently made sig= 
nificant inroads into the import market during the first 
years of the Common Market, the absolute volume of imports 
of tires and tubes from outside countries still remains 
high. This is true in spite of the fact that GINSA is not 
operating near full capacity. The firm maintains that it 
was able to use only 57 per cent of its capacity (in terms
“ l64 —
of sales) in 1966,̂
Costs of Production 
The regional demand curve for GINSA’s tires and 
tubes noticeably shifted as a result of the removal of 
tariffs. There is a possibility that this increased output 
has allowed the firm to enhance its productive efficiency. 
If there are advantages to be gained by large-scale produc­
tion in developing areas, the sales increase should have 
permitted decreases in per unit costs of production.
Theoretical Limitations 
There is not a large number of articles which deal 
with the measurement of production costs. Perhaps one of 
the main reasons for this vacuum is the unavailability of 
data regarding these phenomena. For obvious reasons, firms 
are usually reluctant to provide researchers with these 
statistics.
Almost equally exasperating, however, is the diffi­
culty involved in interpreting production costs. First of
^Exposicion del Gobierno de Guatemala. Problemas 
que afectan a la Industria de Integracldn— de llantas y 
neumAticos estableeida en dicha Repiiblica. n, 3, It is 
significant to note that this claim may be exaggerated, 
GINSA states in 1967 that the capacity of the firm is
300,000 tires. The figure of 57 per cent is based upon 
this capacity. However, in 1966, the capacity of the firm 
probably was closer to the figure required by the first 
protocol or 225,000 tires. In this event, the capacity 
utilization of the firm would have been approximately 76 
per cent, which is still less than full capacity but more 
respectable.
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all, the material utilized must almost always be accounting 
data and the unit period for accounting purposes usually 
differs from the unit economic period.^ Moreover, there 
is a problem regarding the elements that costs should 
include. Should they consist of strict costs of production 
as defined by the payments to the factors or should they 
include the total costs incurred by a plant during a given 
accounting period? Equally as disturbing is the problem 
of allocating costs over the principal product, especially 
since there are often many products produced by a given 
firm.2
Further complications are incurred when the end 
result of an investigation is the determination of econo­
mies or diseconomies of scale. The theory of economies of 
scale is founded on precise concepts. Defined, net internal 
economies of large-scale production refer to net reductions 
in cost to a particular concern arising from a long-run 
expansion in output when its unit is produced from a plant 
of the optimum scale for that output.̂  Economies of scale
Â. A. Walters, "Production and Cost Functions: An
Econometric Survey," Econometrica. XXXI (January-April, 
1963). p. 42.
2Joel Dean, The Relation of Cost to Output for a 
Leather Belt Shop (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of
Economic Research, December, 1941), p. 59®
3jacob Viner, "Cost Curves and Supply Curves," 
Readings in Price Theory. Vol. VI, ed. George Stigler and 
Kenneth Boulding (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1952), p. 213.
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are typically a long-run phenomenon dependent upon the 
appropriate adjustment of the scale of plant to each suc­
cessive output. These are not synonymous with economies 
resulting from spreading the overhead, which is a short- 
run occurrence.^
External economies of scale are economies accruing 
to a particular concern or concerns as a result of the 
expansion of output of an industry as a whole. If an 
industry enjoying net external economies of large production 
increases its output, the average costs of the member con­
cerns of that industry will fall even though many-firms 
maintain a constant scale of plant and a constant output.^ 
Under this definition, external economies are not possible 
in a one-firm industry.
Economies of scale (both internal and external), 
then, refer to the long-run average cost curve or envelope 
curve where all costs are variable. If one considers only 
one scale of plant and, hence, only one cost curve, 
decreases in per unit costs are technically not economies 
of scale but, rather, are movements along the short-run 
average cost curve of a single firm. A legitimate question 
arises as to whether or not adjustments of plant size or 
alterations in a fixed plant (not the construction of a new 




curve. According to George Stigler, such alterations are 
not equivalent to movements along the long-run average cost 
curve because they are based upon changes in the existing 
plant and not the construction of a completely new plant.^ 
The author accepts Stigler*s definition of the 
long-run cost curve. Even though this study is compli­
cated by an addition to capacity, this will not be consid­
ered a long-run phenomenon. The determination of economies 
of scale are, therefore, technically not within the scope 
of this study. This analysis is mainly concerned with 
costs Of production relevant to a single cost curve. Time 
series data are not sufficiently available to estimate the 
cost function? however, an attempt is made to quantify unit 
cost changes over three relevant years.
Unit Costs of Production 
In order to consider the effect of increased sales 
upon costs of production, data are presented for three years» 
1961» 1964, and 1966. As before, two of the three years are 
concerned with operations before the first protocol went 
into effect. The data for I966, though incomplete, permit 
some quantification regarding the impact of the Common 
Market,
^George Stigler, "Production and Distribution in 
the Short Run," Journal of the Political Economy. XLVII 
(June, 1939)» Reprinted in Readings in the Theory of Income 
Distribution, ed. William Pellner and Bernard Haley (Phila- 
delphia: The Blakiston Company, 1946), p. 132,
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Data for 196I and 1964 are presented In Table 13. 
The cost items indicated in this table, although they do 
not constitute total costs for the firm, form the base for 
all calculations.
GINSA stated in 1966 that tires constitute about 
77 per cent of production weight.^ By assuming that this 
weight explains 77 per cent of total costs (Column 2), one 
can estimate a total cost figure for producing tires 
(Column 3). Unfortunately, this does not allow the calcu­
lation of changes in costs caused by increased efficiency 
in producing tires. The actual percentage of costs related 
to tires was not available for either of the years studied. 
Column 4 contains data on the number of tires produced by 
the firm in 196I and 1964. By dividing these numbers into 
the total cost figures in Column 3, it is possible to 
roughly determine the unit cost of producing a tire in I96I 
and 1964,
The calculations presented in Table 13 indicate that 
per unit costs of production changed by less than one dollar 
during the 196I-1964 period. This change was consumâted 
while producing mostly for the Guatemalan market with 
limited sales to other countries. It seems reasonable to 
assume that unit costs were not significantly affected by
^Opinion Sobre si una Planta Acogida al Convenio 
Sobre el Regimen de Industrias Puede Dedicarse a la Manu­
factura de Artfculos Distintos de Aauellos que se Menclonan 
Expresamente en el Correspondiente Protocole, p. 2̂ .
TABLE 13
PER UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS OP TIRES, 




























77% $1,999,690 90.000 $22.23












77 2,203,567 102,895 21.41
SOURCE: Data for I96I from: Guatemala, Consejo Ejeoutlvo, Segunda Reunion, 
dlolembre 10-15» 1962, Seoretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integracldn 
Eoonomioa Centroamericana, Estudio de Evaluaoldn Tecnica-Eoondmloa de la Fabrica de 
Ll^tas y Camaras para Automdyil (SIECA/CE-Il/P.T»2. November 28. 1962) (Guatemala, 
1962),̂  Annex 21} Data for 1964 from: Nicaragua, Consejo Econdmico, Decimotercera
Reunidn Erbraordlnaria, juiiio 15-20, 1966, Seoretaria Permanente del Tratado General 
de Integracldn Econdmica Controamerlcana, Sollcltud de Guatemala (Llantas) (SIECA/ 





the Increase in production associated with the market of 
Guatemala during the period from 1961-1964.
Of more interest is the year 1966 since this should 
supply some preliminary information on the impact of the 
Common Market. The data for this year were only partially 
available and, consequently, estimates based on the known 
data have to be utilized. Table 14 provides information 
concerning this available data and the subsequent estimate 
based on the known figures.^
The estimate of total production costs found in 
Table 14 may be slightly high. That is, the plant of rubber 
by-products may constitute more than 15 per cent of total 
costs. This is possible because GINSA. must pay import 
duties on the equipment and the raw material inputs used 
in the plant of rubber by-products,^ These duties need
^Although 1966 total production costs for the firm 
were not obtainable, the author was able to procure data 
for the plant of rubber by-products. Since GINSA does not 
have the privileges of the scheme in the production of by­
products, the firm keeps ssparato accounts concoming their 
production. On the basis of this information, the method 
used to estimate total costs is the following,
GINSA stated in 1966 that the production of the 
plant of rubber by-products constitutes 14.98 per cent of 
the total production weight of the firm. An assumption is 
made that this weight explains approximately 15 per cent 
of total production costs. On the basis of this assumption, 
total costs can be estimated by dividing the known cost 
figure for the plant of rubber by-products by 15 per cent. 
The result is shown in Table 14,
^Opinion Sobre si una Planta Acogida al Convenio 
Sobre el Regimen de Industries Puede Dedicarse a la Manu- , 
factura dé Artfculos Distintos de Aauellos que se Mencionah 
Sxpressaente en el Corrcspendientg Pretoeolo. p. 30;
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TABLE 14























TOTAL $663,047 15# $4,420,313
 ̂ SOURCE: Honduras, Consejo Ejecutivo, Vlgegimonovena
Reunion, septiembre 17-20, 1^67, Seoretaria Permanente del 
Tratado General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana, 
Opinion ëobre si una Planta Acogida al Convenio Sobre el 
Èe^lmen deïndustrlas Puede Dedicarse a la Manufactura de 
Aruiculos uistintos de Aauellos que se menclonan Eroresa- 
mente en el Ôorrespondlente Protocolo (SIECA/CE-XklX/D.T.22, 
September 14, 1967/ (Guatemala, 1967), Annex 5 and 6.
not be paid for Inputs relevant to the production of tires 
and tubes.
Accordingly, Table 15 attempts to determine the per 
unit costs for production of tires In 1966. The method 
utilized Is the same as that for the data In Table 13, 
except for the fact that these calculations are estimates
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and, therefore, the author has allowed for a 3 per cent 
error in either direction. For example, if the costs of 
production for rubber by-products were as low as 12 per 
cent of total costs, the data in Table 15 indicate that 
unit costs would have been about 22 dollars. On the other 
hand, if they were as high as 18 per cent, unit costs would 
have been about 15 dollars. Because of the import duties 
paid on the materials used in producing these products, 
it is conceivable that costs for the by-products plant 
could have ascended to 18 per cent of total costs. However, 
on the basis of production weight, it seems more reasonable 
to assume that the costs for the plant of by-products con­
stituted approximately 15 per cent of total production 
costs. If this assumption is correct, the per unit cost 
of tires was in the area of #18 in 1966, In 1964, this 
cost was found to be #21,40,^ Consequently, for the cost 
factors considered, per unit costs are estimated to have 
decreased by over #3 after less than two-years operation 
within the context of the Common Market,%
^See Table 13,
2Even if the estimation of costs is correct, one 
cannot state that the improved efficiency was totally the 
direct result of the increased output of the firm. That 
is, GINSA most likely incurred some normal changes in 
efficiency which were not related to the output expansion. 
The exact amount of the estimated unit cost decrease 
attributable to the integration program could only be 
subject to speculation.
TABLE 15
ESTIMATED PER UNIT PRODUCTION COSTS 
OF TIRES FOR THE YEAR 1966 
(In U.S. dollars)




















18^ $3,683,594 77% #2,836,367 188,661 $15.03
17 3,900,276 77 3,003.212 188,661 15.91
16 4,144,044 77 3.190,914 188,661 16.91
15 4,420,313 77 3,403,641 188,661 18.04
1^ 4,736,050 77 3,646,758 188,661 19.32
13 5,100,361 77 3,927,278 188,661 20.81
12 5,525.391 77 4,254,551 188,661 22.55
SOURCE: Based on data from: Honduras, Consejo EJecutivo, Vigesimonovena
Reunion, septiembre 17-20, I967, Seoretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Inte- 
gracion Econdmica Centroamericana, Opinion Sobre si una Planta Acogida al Convenio 
Sobre el Regimen de Industrias Puede Dedicarse a la Manufactura de Artioulos Dis­
tintos de Aauellos que se Menoionan Ezpresamente en el Correspondiente Protooolo 
(SIECA/CE-XXIX/D.T«22, September 1̂ , I967) (Guatemala, 1967), Annex 5 and 6,
H-ow
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A question arises as to whether or not these unit 
costs of producing tires are realistic. It would be helpful 
to have some means of determining the approximate validity 
of the preceding calculations. Although little research 
has been completed on tire costs, one study done by the 
Office of Price Administration in 1941 calculated unit 
costs for several different sized tires for various manu­
facturers. On the basis of raw materials, labor, and 
factory overhead expenses, this study revealed unit produc­
tion costs ranging from $5*29 for a small four-ply auto­
mobile tire to $30,27 for a large ten-ply truck tire.^
Given the fact that more than 50 per cent of GINSA*s tire 
production in 1966 was either for trucks or buses, the 
calculated average costs in Tables 13 and 15 do not seem 
unreasonable.
The Possibility of Economies of Scale 
Technically, the apparent reductions in per unit 
costs cannot be considered as economies of large-scale 
production, GINSA underwent a change in capacity during 
1965; yet, according to Stigler’s definition, this cannot 
be considered as the construction of a new plant and.
^Office of Temporary Controls, Office of Price 
Administration, Economic Data Analysis Branch, Survey of 
Rubber Tire and Tube Manufacturers ("An Economic Data 
Series Report," No, 10; Washington, D.C,: Office of Price
Administration, 1947), Table 8,
2 fComentarios-de la Seoretaria a la Exposicion del 
Gobiemo de Guatemala, p. 6.
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consequently, It is not a long-run phenomenon. Neverthe­
less, given that GINSA virtually doubled its production 
between 1964 and 1966, it is likely that some benefits of 
scale were realized. Pecuniary factors or advantages in 
buying, such as quantity discounts, would be a likely occur­
rence, Also, the firm was no doubt able to spread its over^ 
head over more units of production and, accordingly, reduce 
unit costs. In addition, some normal increases in efficiency 
due to the age of the firm may have been experienced.
It is worth noting that GINSA may have reaped some 
cost benefits as a direct result of the Integration Indus­
tries Scheme, As was mentioned earlier, GINSA is not 
required to pay duties on imported raw materials or equip­
ment relevant to the production of tires and tubes. Since 
the import sector is important to producers in developing 
areas, this cost benefit may be significant. Statistics 
are not available regarding the exact amounts of duties 
paid by GINSA during the period from 1964 to 1966, Also, 
the firm received some import privileges under the fiscal 
incentive laws of Guatemala prior to receiving integration 
status. Still, however, duty reductions would not have had 
to be extremely large to discount a good percentage of the 
projected unit cost reduction over this period. This phe­
nomenon is, of course, completely external to the firm.
There seems to be little likelihood that GINSA has, 
as yet, undergone significant changes which could be
classified as economies resulting from large-scale production. 
The time period was too short for the occurrence of such 
internal factors as improved methods of organisation or reduc­
tions in technological coefficients. The most likely new 
advantage (other than the special import privilege) was 
probably the spreading of overhead costs.
Conclusions
During the period from 1964 to 1966, the sales of 
the integration firm nearly doubled. The imports from 
Guatemala of tires and tubes to Costa Rica, Nicaragua,
KL Salvador, and Honduras increased from #1,381,799 to 
#4,781,106 or more than tripled. This figure constituted 
over one-half of the total sales of GINSA which amounted 
to #8,065,274 in 1966.̂  Still, however, the imports from 
outside countries remained relatively high in spite of the 
fact that the integration firm apparently had substantial 
unused capacity.
The effect of the enlarged market upon the costs of 
producing tires was restricted due to limited data. During 
the period from 1964-1966, unit costs are estimated to have 
decreased approximately #3. Part of these gains may be 
attributable to import privileges associated with the scheme. 
Also, GINSA was able to spread its overhead costs over more
^Opinion Sobre si una Planta^Acogida al Convenio 
Sobre el Regimen de Industrias Puede Dedicarse a la Manu- 
factura de Artfoulos Distintos de Aauellos oue se Menclonan 
\ ScLuiGTit s  sxi O ojT rss^oncxJL oAxtG Â ôTOt000X0 a p# #
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units of output and probably experienced some normal changes 
in efficiency not directly influenced by increased sales,
The designation of more integration industries would 
be desirable if only to obtain more information regarding 
the theoretical soundness of the Integration Industries 
SCjheme, The evidence presented in this chapter does not, 
by any means, confirm the theory supporting this system. 
Although the demand change precipitated by the Common Market 
was, in this case, rather impressive, the effect of this 
change upon production costs is much less certain. Data 
are scanty and results are inconclusive. More important, 
however, is the fact that available evidence does not deny 
that this mechanism could be an efficient method (in terms 
of theory) of promoting industrial development. The message 
of this chapter is not one of pessimism. Rather, the door 
is left open for more investigation and further empirical 
research regarding GINSA and other integration industries. 
Hopefully, in future years, data will tend to become more 
available.
